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THE TAX COURT'S EXECUTION OF THE FAMILY ENTITY:
THE TAX COURT'S APPLICATION OF
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 2036(a)
TO FAMILY ENTITIES
DANIEL H. RUITrENBERG*
The United States Tax Court (Tax Court) has increasingly applied
section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code' to family entities in a man-
ner that greatly reduces, if not virtually eliminates, their usefulness for
estate planning purposes. Section 2036(a) includes in a decedent's gross
estate, for estate tax purposes, assets transferred during his2 life if he re-
tained certain rights over or benefits from the assets.3 Section 2036(a) has
two main components- (a)(1) and (a)(2).4 Section 2036(a)(1) deals with a
donor-decedent's direct retention of the possession or enjoyment of or right
to income from transferred property. 5 Section 2036(a)(2) addresses a
*Daniel H. Ruttenberg is a principal with the law firm of Smolen Plevy in Tysons Corner,
Virginia. His practice areas include estate planning and business/corporate law. He is a member
of the bar in Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia and is licensed as a Certified Public
Accountant by the State of Maryland. Mr. Ruttenberg graduated from George Mason University
School of Law with Honors. He received a Bachelor of Science degree with a double major in
Accounting and Finance from the University of Maryland. Mr. Ruttenberg is the Treasurer of the
Fairfax Bar Association.
Mr. Ruttenberg would like to express his deep appreciation to Kyung (Kathryn) Dickerson,
Neil Ruttenberg, Eric Ciazza, Shelby Wilson, Curt Rodebush, and Karen Brodsky for their
insightful review of and comments on this paper.
1. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1986).
2. For purposes of this paper, unspecified individuals, such as the anonymous decedent in
this sentence, shall be referred to in the masculine gender. Such reference is for convenience only
and is not intended to exclude the applicability of this paper to females.
3. The federal government imposes a tax on the estate of "every decedent who is a citizen or
resident of the United States" with regard to the testamentary disposition of such decedent's
"taxable estate." I.R.C. § 2001(a) (1986). A decedent's taxable estate is determined by sub-
tracting any applicable deductions from his "gross estate." I.R.C. § 2051 (1986). To the extent
provided for in sections 2032 through 2046, such decedent's gross estate equals "the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated."
I.R.C. § 2031 (1986).
Primarily, sections 2032 through 2046 detail rules regarding which assets are includable in a
decedent's gross estate, as well as the value of such assets. I.R.C. § 2032-46 (1986). For exam-
ple, section 2042 lays out the rules for when life insurance proceeds are included in a decedent's
gross estate; section 2041 governs when a decedent's power of appointment over assets causes
such assets to be included in his gross estate; and section 2036 includes in a decedent's gross
estate, assets he gave away during his life if he retained certain rights over or benefits from the
transferred property. I.R.C. § 2036, 2041, 2042 (1986).
4. Id. § 2036 (a)(1)-(2).
5. Id. § 2036(a)(1).
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donor-decedent's retention of the right to designate who receives the
possession or enjoyment of or income from transferred property.6
In United States v. Byrum, 7 the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that a family entity established and controlled by a donor-decedent did
not violate section 2036(a)(2). 8 Its ruling was based, in part, on the theory
that a donor-decedent's proper management of a family entity is not equi-
valent to a "right to designate" within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2)
since his fiduciary duty to the family entity and its other owners limits his
right to make distributions of income or determine who possesses or enjoys
the family entity's property. 9 While the Supreme Court based its ruling on
a number of factors, for over 15 years the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has repeatedly ruled that underlying assets of family entities established and
managed by donor-decedents were not includable in the donor-decedents'
gross estates based solely on the fiduciary duty rationale.10 Estate planners,
relying on the IRS's approval, have commonly utilized family entities for
various purposes, including giving gifts and obtaining valuation discounts
for transfer tax purposes. I I
Despite approving the form of the family entities under section
2036(a)(2), the IRS has found many of these claimed valuation discounts to
be abusive and has attacked them on a number of grounds, including
Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code (Special Valuation Rules), the
economic substance doctrine, and immediate gift upon formation.12 The
Tax Court, however, has regularly ruled against the IRS on all these
attacks.' 3 Nevertheless, the Tax Court seems to recognize there is a prob-
lem with some valuation discounts claimed by taxpayers and is using
section 2036(a) as its solution.14 A successful section 2036(a) claim in-
cludes all the assets that a donor-decedent transferred to a family entity in
the donor-decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes, and the interest in
the family entity is disregarded. Such a result is particularly painful for the
6. Id. § 2036(a)(2).
7. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
8. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 136-51.
9. See generally id. at 136-44.
10. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15,
1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-021 (Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); and
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993).
11. Valuation discounts can be used for gift tax and estate tax purposes. While the issues re-
lated to gift taxes and estate taxes are often similar, this article primarily focuses on the estate tax.
12. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 484-93 (2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000).
13. Id.
14. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 492-93.
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taxpayer. Not only are valuation discounts unavailable (as they relate to the
disregarded family entity), but all gifts made of such assets are brought
back into the donor-decedent's gross estate as well.
This article addresses how the Tax Court laid the groundwork to curb
perceived valuation discount abuses through an unorthodox interpretation
of section 2036(a) and eventually established precedent that eviscerates the
use of most family entities for estate planning purposes. Part I of this arti-
cle explains the advantages of family entities, including how they can be
used to obtain valuation discounts. Part II reviews the failed attempts by
the IRS to have these discounts disregarded when determining the value of
a donor-decedent's gross estate. Part III reviews section 2036(a)'s purpose
and colorful history. Part IV explains how courts currently apply section
2036(a) to include the underlying assets in a family entity (including those
previously transferred to other family members or third parties) in a donor-
decedent's gross estate. This part of the article first discusses how the
Supreme Court applies section 2036(a)(2) to family entities. It then dis-
cusses how the Supreme Court applies section 2036(a)(1) to family entities
and focuses on how the Tax Court's rationales in applying section
2036(a)(1) have been inconsistent with that of the Supreme Court's. It then
revisits section 2036(a)(2) as interpreted in a recent Tax Court memo-
randum opinion. Part V compares how the Tax Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apply the parenthetical exception to
section 2036(a) related to a bona fide sale for full and adequate con-
sideration and cautions about potential abuses associated with an overbroad
interpretation thereof. Part VI comments on whether the valuation dis-
counts in question are abusive. It also recommends ways valuation
discount issues should be addressed if it is determined that such valuation
discounts should not be allowed-mainly that Congress should address
these valuation discounts through legislative enactments instead of the Tax
Court through the inconsistent application of section 2036(a).
I. A REVIEW OF FAMILY ENTITIES
A "family entity" generally refers to a corporation, limited liability
company (LLC) or limited partnership that is owned primarily by family
members.15 A "family entity" is not a legal term of art for a special type of
15. See, e.g., Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 481; Knight, 115 T.C. at 509-10; Reichardt v.
Comm'r, 114, T.C. 144, 147-49 (2000); Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2856
(1997); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1972).
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entity created under state law, such as a professional service corporation.16
It is merely a commonly used term for when the ownership of a legal entity
consists primarily of family members.
A. NON-TAX ADVANTAGES OF FAMILY ENTITIES
Family entities have many potential advantages, most of which are not
related to tax savings. The following are some common reasons they are
formed:
Family entities can help protect assets from creditors or failed mar-
riages.17 An agreement among owners, such as a partnership agreement of
a family limited partnership (FLP), could require partners to approve
transfers of interests, thereby preventing a creditor or former spouse from
becoming a partner. Such an agreement could also allow family members
to purchase a partner's interest at a discounted rate in the event of
bankruptcy or divorce. 18
Family entities facilitate creating and changing fractional ownership of
property. For example, if an individual wanted to annually gift the annual
exclusion amount for gift tax purposes ($11,000 as of 2003) worth of his
$2,000,000 ranch to each of his five children, a non-family entity solution
would be to deed an undivided fractional interest in the real estate to them
the first year. Each year thereafter, he would have to re-deed the property
to reflect the changed interests. If he thereafter wanted to sell the ranch, he
would have to get all of his children to sign the new deed. Instead, the indi-
vidual could transfer the ranch to a family entity and give each child an
interest in the family entity worth $11,000 each year. A family entity's
ownership agreement could permit a manager to sign on the entity's behalf
in the event of a sale.
Family entities can be used to pool assets of family members.19 This
can enable family members to obtain better rates of return through
economies of scale. For example, investment managers often charge a
16. The requirements of professional service corporations or professional corporations vary
from state to state. However, they generally refer to a corporation duly organized under state law
that is restricted to engaging in specified professional service activities and to ownership by
individuals licensed to practice in such profession. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS
§§ 5-101 to -134 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598, at *7 (5th Cir.
2004); Knight, 115 T.C. at 508.
18. However, a creditor or former spouse may be entitled to the income from such bankrupt
or divorced partner's interest.
19. See, e.g., Kimbell, 2004 WL 1119598, at *7; Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,
1652 (2002).
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lower percentage fee for managing larger sums. Pooling of assets also
facilitates diversification of assets and can allow the most business savvy
member of the family to manage the family's wealth.
Family entities can protect the assets of a financially irresponsible
individual (i.e., spendthrift protection). 20 An agreement among the owners
of a family entity can give a manager of the entity the discretion to decide
when income or principal should be distributed to the owners. This allows
a family entity to control the access a financially irresponsible member has
to his assets and may help preserve the spendthrift's assets for the future.
Family entities can assist in the transition of a family business from
older generations to younger ones. 21 If a family entity owns a family busi-
ness, the receipt of ownership interests in the family entity can encourage
younger family members to become involved in the business.
Family entities can reduce the costs and delays associated with
probate. It is much more efficient to transfer, via probate, an ownership
interest in a family entity than to transfer an interest in each of the family
entity's underlying assets. Furthermore, ancillary probate is generally re-
quired in any jurisdiction where the decedent owned, in his own name, real
estate or an interest therein (e.g., timeshares, oil and mineral rights, etc.).
However, if such assets are owned through a family entity, ancillary probate
is generally not required.
B. ESTATE TAX ADVANTAGES OF FAMILY ENTITIES
Family entities may also provide estate tax advantages by reducing the
value of a decedent's gross estate through gifts and valuation discounts. As
previously discussed, family entities facilitate creating and changing
fractional ownership of assets and therefore, simplify and aid in the making
of inter vivos gifts of fractional interests. Gifts not only reduce the donor's
gross estate by the amount of the gift, but all subsequent appreciation on
and income from the gifted asset are kept out of the gross estate as well. 22
Often, a donor utilizes his annual gift tax exclusion by gifting interests in a
family entity each year.23 By utilizing his annual exclusion, a donor is able
20. See, e.g., Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1652; Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 152
(2000).
21. See, e.g., Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 579-80 (2003).
22. With some exceptions and exclusions, section 2501 imposes a tax "for each calendar year
on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual." I.R.C. § 2501
(1986).
23. A taxpayer may exclude, for gift tax purposes, the first $10,000 (adjusted for inflation
from 1997 and rounded down to the nearest $1,000) gifted to each individual during the calendar
year. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1986). The annual exclusion adjusted for inflation for 2004 is $11,000.
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to reduce his estate while preserving his lifetime applicable exclusion
amount for later use.24 However, gifts in excess of the donor's annual
exclusion and up to the donor's available gift tax applicable exclusion
amount also provide an estate tax savings. There is no gift tax on such
transfers and subsequent appreciation on and income from the gifted assets
are not included in a donor-decedent's gross estate.25 Furthermore, if gift
taxes are paid on an inter vivos transfer, there are often additional estate tax
savings, for the gift taxes paid are generally not included in the donor-
decedent's gross estate.2 6 The Supreme Court has recognized gifting as an
acceptable form of estate planning.27
Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184. For example, a taxpayer may exclude, for gift tax pur-
poses, each $11,000 gift made in 2004 to his three children, his niece, his best friend, etc.
Additionally, a husband and wife may give double the annual exclusion (i.e., $22,000) to each
individual, even if the gifted asset came from just one of them. I.R.C. § 2513 (1986).
In order to qualify for the annual exclusion, a donor must gift a present interest. I.R.C. §
2503(b). "An unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property or the
income from property (such as a life estate or term certain) is a present interest in property."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 1983).
24. A taxpayer is allowed a credit for the gift taxes imposed on the first $1,000,000 (i.e., the
gift tax applicable exclusion amount) gifted in excess of his annual exclusion. I.R.C. § 2505(a)
(2003). This is not an annual credit, but is cumulative over the taxpayer's lifetime. Id.
A taxpayer is also allowed a credit for estate taxes due on an amount equal to his remaining
estate tax applicable exclusion amount. I.R.C. § 2010 (1986). The use of the applicable exclusion
amount for gift tax purposes reduces a taxpayer's available applicable exclusion amount for estate
tax purposes. The estate tax applicable exclusion amount is currently $1,500,000, but it is sche-
duled to increase to $2,000,000 in 2006 and $3,500,000 in 2009. I.R.C. § 2010(c). In 2010, the
estate tax is repealed. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that increase the estate tax
applicable exclusion amount and eventually repeal the estate tax sunset after December 31, 2010.
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901. After December 31, 2010, the estate tax applicable exclusion amount
returns to the amount it was under prior law (i.e., $1,000,000).
25. For example, assume a donor gave stock worth $10,000 to his child in 1990. Further
assume that the donor died in 2004 when the stock was worth $1,000,000. Not only is the original
$10,000 gift not included in the donor's gross estate, but the $990,000 of appreciation is excluded
as well.
26. The potential estate tax savings for gift taxes paid is demonstrated in the following
example:
Facts: Parent has $2,000,000 for Child. Parent is deciding between i) leaving the
$2,000,000 to Child in Parent's will or ii) giving $1,000,000 to Child now and letting
the Child inherit the remainder after payment of gift taxes. (Assume a flat 50% trans-
fer tax on all gifts or bequests.)
Scenario #1 - Parent bequeaths $2,000,000 to Child: The estate tax on the transfer is
$1,000,000 (2,000,000 x 50%). Child is left with $1,000,000 after payment of estate
tax.
Scenario # 2 - Parent gives $1,000,000 to Child: Parent pays $500,000 gift tax on
transfer (1,000,000 x 50%). The total cost of the gift is $1,500,000 ($1,000,000 gift
plus $500,000 gift tax). Child inherits remaining $500,000 ($2,000,000 less
$1,500,000). The estate tax on $500,000 is $250,000. Child receives $250,000 after
payment of the estate tax. Child ultimately receives $1,250,000 ($1,000,000 gift plus
$250,000 from inheritance).
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Valuation discounts tend to be more controversial. For purposes of
valuing a decedent's gross estate, interests in family entities may be valued
at less than the fair market value of such interest's proportionate share of
the entity's underlying assets. For example, assume a decedent's gross es-
tate included a 70% interest in a FLP. Further assume that the FLP owns
assets with a fair market value of $1,000,000. Without discounting, the de-
cedent's interest in the FLP would be valued at $700,000 ($1,000,000 x
70%). However, if a 40% discount applies to the interest, its value would
be reduced by $280,000 ($700,000 x 40%) to $420,000, thereby creating a
significant estate tax savings. The most common discounts applied to
interests in family entities are for lack of control and lack of marketability,
although other discounts (e.g., portfolio, etc.) may apply.28 A discount for
lack of control measures the reduction in value attributable to limitations on
the decedent's ability to manage, operate, sell, or otherwise control the
underlying assets. A discount for lack of marketability results from the li-
quidity problems associated with trying to sell fractional interests in assets
and from any applicable contractual or state law restrictions on transfers.
Ownership agreements and state law usually subject owners to restrictions
on transferring their interests in family entities and on their control over the
entity's assets. This creates valuation discounts for lack of control and lack
of marketability for family owned entities.
Many estate-planners have actively marketed family entities to clients
based on the benefit of valuation discounts; however, the IRS has chal-
lenged these discounts in a number of instances. 29
II. IRS ATTACKS ON FAMILY ENTITIES.
The IRS has challenged, under many theories, valuation discounts of
interests in family entities taken for purposes of determining a decedent's
gross estate. It has attacked family entities on the grounds the entities: (i)
lack economic substance, (ii) should have the special valuation rules of
The $250,000 transfer tax savings comes about because the $500,000 gift tax paid in not included
in Parent's gross estate. However, if the gift were made within three years of Parent's death, the
gift tax paid would be included in Parent's gross estate, thwarting the transfer tax savings. I.R.C.
§ 2035(b) (1986).
27. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 149 n.34 (1972).
28. "A portfolio discount applies to a company that owns two or more operations or assets,
the combination of which would not be particularly attractive to a buyer." Knight v. Comm'r, 115
T.C. 506, 517 (2000).
29. See id at 512; see also Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 480 (2000), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114, T.C. 144, 147
(2000); Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 384 (2002); Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2857 (1997).
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Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code applied to them, 30 and (iii) created
an immediate gift upon formation. 31 In Strangi v. Commissioner32 (Strangi
I), the IRS made all three of these claims.
Strangi I dealt with an FLP that was controlled by Strangi's children
via a controlling interest in the FLP's 1% corporate general partner,
Stranco. 33 Strangi owned a 99% limited partnership interest in the FLP and
a 47% interest in Stranco (i.e., 99.47% of the FLP).34 Strangi's children
owned 52% of Stranco and an independent charity owed 1%.35 Strangi's
estate claimed that the FLP was formed "(1) to reduce executor and at-
torney's fees payable at the death of the decedent, (2) to insulate decedent
from an anticipated tort claim and the estate from a will contest (by creating
another layer through which creditors must go to reach assets conveyed to
the partnership), and (3) to provide a joint investment vehicle for man-
agement of decedent's assets." 36 Strangi's estate tax return claimed that his
interest in the FLP should be discounted 33% for lack of marketability and
lack of control.37
The IRS argued that the FLP lacked economic substance and "should
be disregarded in valuing assets in the decedent's estate."38 It asserted that
none of the restrictions on control or transferability imposed by the FLP
that would otherwise justify a valuation discount should be taken into ac-
count. The IRS based this argument on the economic substance doctrine,
which states that "[t]ransactions which have no economic purpose or sub-
stance other than the avoidance of taxes will be disregarded." 39
30. See Section I.R.C. §§ 2701 to 2704 (2003) (setting out special valuation rules for transfer
tax purposes).
31. See, e.g., Knight, 115 T.C. 506, 513, 519; Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 489; Harper v.
Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1646 (2002); Thompson, 84 T.C.M. at 385-86.
32. 115 T.C. 478 (2000).
33. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 481. "The partnership agreement provided that Stranco
had the sole authority to conduct the business affairs of [the FLP] without the concurrence of any
limited partner or other general partner." Id.
34. Id.
35. Strangi had four children and each of them initially owned 13.25% of Stranco. Estate of
Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1334 (2003). Strangi's children subsequently gave
1% of Stranco to an independent charity, the McLennan Community College Foundation. Id. at
1338.
36. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 485.
37. Id. at 483. "Estate tax return" refers to IRS Form 706, United States Estate (and
Generation Skipping Transfer) Tax Return.
38. Id. at 484.
39. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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The Tax Court disagreed with the IRS and made it very clear that such
attacks would not succeed in the estate tax arena.4O The Tax Court stated
that it was "skeptical of' and did "not believe" the alleged business pur-
poses of the FLP.41 Nevertheless, the Tax Court determined that
"[r]egardless of subjective intentions, the partnership had sufficient sub-
stance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its existence would not be dis-
regarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets." 42  This willing
buyer/willing seller analysis makes it virtually impossible for a family
entity to be disregarded under the economic substance doctrine as all that
seems to be required is that an entity be duly created under state law.
The IRS also argued that section 2703 of Chapter 14 requires that the
partnership form be disregarded.43 Section 2703 provides that certain re-
strictions on "property" should be disregarded for estate and gift tax
purposes.44 The IRS claimed that "the term 'property' in section 2703(a)(2)
means the underlying assets in the partnership and that the partnership form
is the restriction that must be disregarded."45
The Tax Court disagreed and determined that the purpose of section
2703 was to "value property interests more accurately when they were
transferred, instead of including previously transferred property in the trans-
feror's estate." 46 The Tax Court concluded "that Congress did not intend,
40. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 487-90. The Tax Court also rejected this argument for gift
tax purposes in Knight. Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 514 (2000). The Tax Court issued
opinions in Knight and Estate of Strangi I consecutively.
41. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 485.
42. Id. at 486-87.
43. Id. at 487.
44. I.R.C. § 2703 (1986). Section 2703 states the following:
Section 2703. Certain Rights and Restrictions Disregarded.
(a) GENERAL RULE. - For purposes of this subtitle, the value of any property shall be
determined without regard to-
(]) any option, agreement, or other right to acquire or use the property at a price less
than the fair market value of the property (without regard to such option, agreement, or
right), or
(2) any restriction on the right to sell or use such property.
(b) EXCEPTIONS. - Subsection (a) shall not apply to any option, agreement, right, or
restriction which meets each of the following requirements:
(1) It is a bona fide business arrangement.
(2) It is not a device to transfer such property to members of the decedent's family for
less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
(3) Its terms are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an
arms' length transaction
Id.
45. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 488.
46. Id.
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by the enactment of section 2703, to treat partnership assets as if they were
assets of the estate where the legal interest owned by the decedent at the
time of death was a limited partnership or corporate interest."
47  Ac-
cordingly, the Tax Court concluded that section 2703 did not require the
FLP in Strangi I to be disregarded.
4 8
Alternatively, the IRS argued that if the FLP is valid and Strangi's
assets were reduced in value when he placed them in the FLP, Strangi made
an immediate gift equal to the loss in value when he transferred the assets to
the FLP.49 The Tax Court disagreed with this analysis as well and noted
that "the disparity between the value of the assets in the hands of decedent
and the alleged value of his partnership interest reflects on the credibility of
the claimed discount applicable to the partnership interest. It does not
reflect a taxable gift."50
Strangi I made it very clear that the Tax Court will uphold the validity
of a family entity in almost any situation. 51 However, over the last several
years, the Tax Court has, in several cases, included a family entity's under-
lying assets in a donor-decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1),
thereby making any claimed valuation discounts irrelevant.5
2 The Tax
Court has broadened its application of section 2036(a)(1) to include more
family entity arrangements with each successive opinion. It now appears
that the Tax Court will apply section 2036(a)(1) to the vast majority of
family entities currently being utilized for estate planning. 53 Recently, the
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 489. The following is an example of the IRS's argument: Donor contributed assets
worth $10,000,000 to a family entity in exchange for an interest in the family entity. The IRS
claimed that if, immediately after the contribution, Donor's interest in the entity was only worth
$6,000,000 due to a 40% valuation discount, then the $4,000,000 reduction in value was an im-
mediate gift to the other owners of the family entity.
50. Id. at 490.
51. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holdings in Strangi I with regard to the economic substance doctrine, Chapter 14 and immediate
gift on formation. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
The IRS has also lost its attempts to have family entities disregarded for gift tax purposes
under similar theories to those utilized by the IRS in Strangi I. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm'r, 115
T.C. 506, 514 (2000). Although, the IRS has been successful in reducing the amounts of claimed
valuation discounts for both gift and estate tax purposes. See, e.g., Id. at 519; Estate of Strangi,
115 T.C. at 492-493.
52. See, e.g., Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858 (1997); Reichardt v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 158 (2000); Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1652 (2002);
Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 387 (2002).
53. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1336 (2003).
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Tax Court also issued an opinion that would apply section 2036(a)(2) to
most family entities as well.54
If section 2036(a) is applied to a donor-decedent's interest in a family
entity, the assets the donor-decedent contributed to the family entity are
included in his gross estate for estate tax purposes, including those
representing assets that were previously gifted away.55 Since the family en-
tity's underlying assets are included in the donor-decedent's gross estate,
any interest he owned in the family entity is not included in the donor-
decedent's gross estate as it would be a double counting of his assets.
Accordingly, valuation discounts associated with the donor-decedent's in-
terest in the family entity but not with the family entity's underlying assets
are not taken into account.
The Tax Court's reasoning behind applying section 2036(a) is
inconsistent with that of the Supreme Court's. These inconsistencies and
concerns arising therefrom are discussed in detail in Part IV below. How-
ever, to understand the concerns associated with the Tax Court's rationales,
it is helpful to review the original intent behind section 2036(a).
III. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF SECTION 2036(a)
Congress first enacted the modem version of the federal estate tax on
September 8, 1916, titled "Estate Tax Act."56 The Estate Tax Act included
the original predecessor of section 2036(a),57 which imposed a tax on the
transfer of a decedent's net estate to the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer or with respect to which
he has created a trust in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
54. Id. at 1343.
55. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1986).
56. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80 (1916). The
first federal estate tax was enacted in 1797 to help finance a conflict with France. Act of July 5,
1797, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (1797). It was repealed a few years later in 1802 after the conflict ended.
Act of April 6, 1802, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (1802). Thereafter, various forms of a federal estate act
were enacted to help finance the Civil War and the Spanish-American War and then repealed after
the conflicts were over. The Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 485 (1862) (enacted to
finance Civil War); The Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223 (1864) (increased tax to
further finance Civil War) Act of 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256 (1870) (repealed 1864 Act); War
Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448 (1898) (enacted to finance Spanish-American War);
and Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-178, 32 Stat. 406 (1902) (repealed 1898 Act).
57. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact an estate tax that attempted to tax transfers that
were testamentary in nature. Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 637 (1949). The
Pennsylvania law stated that it was "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after.., death." Gertrude C.K. Leighton, Origin of the Phrase, 'Intended To Take Effect in
Possession or Enjoyment At or After Death' (section 811(c), Internal Revenue Code), 56 YALE
L.J. 176 (1946). See Acts cited supra note 56 (using the term "possession or enjoyment").
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possession or enjoyment at or after his death, "except any part sold to a
bona fide purchaser for a fair consideration in money or money's worth."
58
The provision was re-codified as section 402(c) in the Revenue Acts of
1918 and 1921 and as section 302(c) in the Revenue Acts of 1924 and
1926.59
In its original form, the plain language of the statute suggests that
Congress was trying to apply the estate tax to transfers that were
testamentary in nature-transfers made in contemplation of death or
intended to take effect at death.60 Initially, this law was trying to prevent
the common estate-planning strategy of retaining a life estate in transferred
assets.61 The remainder interest would not be included in the decedent's
gross estate and the life estate would be valued at zero for estate tax
purposes. The Supreme Court repeatedly remarked, "[i]t is true that an in-
genious mind may devise other means of avoiding an inheritance tax, but
the one commonly used is a transfer with reservation of a life estate."
62
From 1916 until 1929, it appeared to be a well-settled principal that
retention of a life estate was deemed to be retention of "possession and
enjoyment" of the asset and, therefore, the value of the entire asset, not just
the life estate, was included in a donor-decedent's gross estate. "The regu-
lations had so provided and millions of dollars had been collected from
taxpayers on this basis."63
Clearly there are many more ingenious minds than Congress imagined,
and, as is often the case, the boundaries of the law were tested. The first
sign of trouble for the IRS was in 1929 with Reinecke v. Northern Trust
58. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 209, 39 Stat. 756, 780 (1916). This pro-
vision also seems to be the original predecessor to parts of sections 2035, 2037 and 2038.
59. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097 (1919); Revenue
Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 227, 278 (1921); Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L.
No. 68-176, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 253, 304 (1924); Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 302(c),
44 Stat. 9, 70 (1926). With the exception of the amendment to section 302(c), discussed infra,
section 302(c) was carried over in substantially the same form in various revenue acts until it was
re-codified as section 81 l(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Thereafter, section
811 (c)(l)(B) was re-codified as section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
60. See United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969); see also Harper v. Comm'r, 83
T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1647 (2002) (quoting Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir.
1971) (stating that "[the statute] 'describes a broad scheme of inclusion in the gross estate, not
limited by the form of the transaction, but concerned with all inter vivos transfers where outright
disposition of the property is delayed until the transferor's death")).
61. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 638.
62. Id. (quoting Matter of Keeney's Estate, 194 N.Y. 281, 287 (1909); Keeney v. Comp-
troller of State of New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912)).
63. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 639; see, e.g., T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 771
(1919); 74 CONG. REC. 7078-7199 (1931).
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Co.64 In Reinecke, the Supreme Court signaled that the statutory language
of section 302(c) was ambiguous as to an inter vivos remainder interest that
was not given "at death or made in contemplation of death." 65 Reinecke did
not involve the retention of a life estate.66 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
warned Congress to be clearer in its statutory language if it wanted
remainder interests to be included in the donor's estate. 67
We are asked to say that this statute means that he may not make a
gift inter vivos, equally absolute and complete, without subjecting
it to a tax if the gift takes the form of a life estate in one with
remainder over to another at or after the donor's death. It would
require plain and compelling language to justify so incongruous a
result and we think it is wanting in the present statute.68
Apparently, no one but estate planners paid attention to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Reinecke because, thereafter, several individuals at-
tempted to push cases down a slippery slope with challenges as to whether
remainder interests should be included in donor-decedents' gross estates.
In 1930, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to enforce its
interpretation of the statute in May v. Heiner.69 The Supreme Court ruled,
per curiam, that the assets of a trust, which provided income to the
grantor's spouse for his life and then to the grantor for her life with the
remainder to their children, were not includable in the grantor's gross
estate. 70 In May, the Supreme Court again challenged Congress to change
64. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
65. Reinecke, 278 U.S. at 347.
66. The decedent in Reinecke was the grantor of seven trusts. Id. In two of the trusts, he
retained income from the trust assets for life plus the power to revoke the trust. Id. The Court
held "that a transfer made subject to a power of revocation in the transferor, terminable at his
death, is not complete until his death," and therefore, includable in such decedent's gross estate.
Id. at 345. In the other five trusts, the grantor reserved the managerial powers over trust assets and
the power to "alter, change or modify the trust" with the consent of at least one beneficiary. Id.
The Court held that management powers did not cause the transfer to be incomplete. Id. at 346. It
further held that since the power to modify required the consent of at least one adverse party, "the
trust, for all practical purposes, had passed as completely from any control by decedent which
might inure to his own benefit as if the gift had been absolute." Id. Accordingly, the Reinecke
case did not directly address the retention of a life estate. Id.
67. Id. at 347-48.
68. Id.
69. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
70. May, 281 U.S. at 244-45. It should be noted that at the time of this decision there was
not a tax on gifts. A tax on gifts was imposed in the Revenue Act of 1924. Revenue Act of 1924,
Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 319, 43 Stat. 253, 313 (1924). However, that gift tax was repealed shortly
thereafter. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 126 (1926). Therefore,
individuals could completely avoid transfer taxation by giving away a remainder interest in an
asset while retaining a life estate.
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the language of section 302(c).71 Finally, on March 2, 1931, the Supreme
Court put an exclamation point on Reinecke by issuing three per curiam
opinions: Burnet v. Northern Trust Co.,72 Morsman v. Burnet,73 and
McCormick v. Burnet.7
4
In both Northern Trust Co. and Morsman, the Supreme Court held that
a trust in which the grantor retained the right to income for his life was not
included in the grantor's gross estate. 75 In McCormick, the Supreme Court
held that a trust in which the grantor had: i) the right to request distributions
of income (in certain situations), ii) the power to terminate the trust with the
approval of any one beneficiary, and iii) a remainder interest if he survived
the named beneficiaries, was not included in the grantor's gross estate.
76
As their citations suggest, these rulings were very succinct and made it very
clear that remainder interests would escape estate taxation under section
302(c) as then stated in the Revenue Act of 1926.
Despite all of the Supreme Court's warnings, these three per curiam
opinions were a surprise to then Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden
Mills. The day after they were issued, Mr. Mills wrote a letter to the
Speaker of the House explaining the implications of May and its progeny.
77
Mr. Mill's concerns were expressed to both houses of Congress.78 No one
in Congress seemed to have been paying attention to the Supreme Court
either. "Senator Smoot, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said
on the floor of the Senate that this judicial interpretation of the statute
'came almost like a bombshell, because nobody ever anticipated such a
decision."' 79 That same day, in what was one of the fastest actions by the
legislative branch in our government's history, both houses of Congress
unanimously passed and the President signed an amendment to section
71. May, 281 U.S. at 244 (quoting Reinecke v. N. Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 347 (1929)).
72. 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
73. 283 U.S. 783 (1931).
74. 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
75. N. Trust Co., 283 U.S. at 783, affg Comm'r v. N. Trust Co., 41 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1930);
Morsman, 283 U.S. at 784, rev'g Comm'r v. Morsman, 44 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1930).
76. McCormick, 283 U.S. at 784, rev'g Comm'r v. McCormick, 43 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1930).
77. Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 639 (1949). "He pointed out the disastrous
effects they would have on the estate tax law and urged that Congress 'in order to prevent tax
evasion,' immediately 'correct this situation' brought about by May v. Heiner and the other
cases." Id. (quoting 74 CONG REC. 7198, 7199). "He expressed fear that without such action the
Government would suffer 'a loss in excess of one-third of the revenue derived from the federal
estate tax, with anticipated refunds of in excess of $25,000,000."' Id.
78. 74 CONG. REC. 7198, 7199 (1931).
79. Church, 335 U.S. at 640 (quoting 74 CONG. REC. 7078 (1931)).
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302(c). 80 The amended section 302(c) is substantially the same as the
current version of section 2036(a).
Section 2036(a) reads as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE - The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to
his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall posses or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom. 81
IV. CURRENT APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036(a) TO FAMILY
ENTITIES
Section 2036(a) has two basic components. Section 2036(a)(1)
addresses when a decedent directly retains certain benefits from transferred
assets, and section 2036(a)(2) addresses when a decedent may designate
who can receive certain benefits.82 The Supreme Court's analysis of
section 2036(a)(2) is important in understanding section 2036(a)(1) and
therefore, discussed first.
A. SECTION 2036(a)(2)
Under section 2036(a)(2), assets transferred during a decedent's life are
included in the decedent's gross estate if he retained the right to designate
the person(s) who shall possess or enjoy the transferred property or the
person(s) who shall possess or enjoy the income from such property. 83
80. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169, (1932).
81. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (1986).
82. Id. § 2036(a)(1)-(2). Section 2036(a) also contains a parenthetical exception to the gen-
eral rule of inclusion in a decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1) or (2). Id. § 2036(a). It
provides that a transfer described in sections 2036(a)(1) or (2) results in inclusion in the dece-
dent's gross estate, "except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." Id.
83. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2); see infra Part IV.B (discussing possession and enjoyment).
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Essentially, section 2036(a)(2) deals with the situation where a decedent
gave away assets during life but retained certain controls over how and
when his donees received and enjoyed the transferred assets. 84 This section
does not address a decedent's direct retention of the benefits of transferred
assets. Section 2036(a)(1) deals with direct retention of benefits.
Prior to the 1931 amendment, when there was no statutory analogy to
section 2036(a)(2), the Supreme Court recognized that a grantor's retention
of management powers did not, in and of itself, cause trust assets to be tax-
able in the grantor's estate. 85 After the enactment of the predecessor to
section 2036(a)(2), the IRS argued that a grantor's retention of management
powers over trust assets gave the grantor the ability to invest trust assets in
a manner that allowed him to control the amount of income available to cur-
rent beneficiaries; the grantor could invest trust funds in income producing
assets or non-income producing assets. 86 The IRS claimed that this control
over income enabled the grantor to shift income between current bene-
ficiaries and remaindermen and, therefore, the grantor retained the right to
designate who enjoyed the income from the transferred property. 87 The IRS
was unsuccessful in this attempt as many lower courts did not concur that
the retention of management powers amounted to a retention of the right to
designate who enjoyed the income from trust assets. 88 Instead, they "up-
held the [grantor's] right to exercise managerial powers without incurring
estate-tax liability." 89 The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in 1972.90
The Supreme Court addressed when a grantor of a trust, acting as
trustee of such trust, had the power and discretion to distribute trust income
to current beneficiaries or accumulate it and add it to principal in United
States v. O'Malley.91 The Supreme Court determined that such a power en-
abled the grantor to delay distributing income until the income beneficiary's
death, thereby controlling whether the income beneficiaries or the re-
84. See id.
85. Reinecke v. N. Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 346 (1929).
86. See, e.g., Estate of King v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 973 (1962); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962);
Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 114 (1969), aff'd 450 F.2d 878 (2nd Cir. 1971); Estate of
Wilson v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 869 (1949) (en banc), aff'd 187 F.2d 145 (3rd Cir. 1951); Estate of
Budd v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Pardee v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 140 (1967).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 133 (1972).
90. Id. at 135.
91. 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
[VOL. 80:41
2004] THE TAX COURT'S EXECUTION OF THE FAMILY ENTITY 57
maindermen would receive the income. 92 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
ruled that such a power should be "deemed the power to 'designate' within
the meaning of [section 2036(a)(2)]." 93 Such retention of the power to dis-
tribute or accumulate income is considered the classic example of a
decedent retaining the right to designate who shall posses or enjoy such in-
come. Therefore, a donor-decedent may manage trust assets, but may not
have discretion as to when income is distributed to the beneficiaries.
The IRS tried to expand this concept to the corporate setting. In United
States v. Byrum, the decedent, Byrum, transferred shares of stock from three
closely held corporations into an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his
children. 94 He named an independent bank as the sole trustee.95
The trust agreement vested in the trustee broad and detailed
powers with respect to the control and management of the trust
property. These powers were exercisable in the trustee's sole dis-
cretion, subject to certain rights reserved by Byrum: (i) to vote the
shares of unlisted stock held in the trust estate, (ii) to disapprove
the sale or transfer of any trust assets, including the shares trans-
ferred to the trust, (iii) to approve investments and reinvestments,
and (iv) to remove the trustee and "designate another corporate
Trustee to serve as successor."96
Byrum owned a controlling interest (at least 71%) in each corporation
prior to transferring the stock to the trust.97 He maintained this control after
the transfer since he retained the right to vote the shares transferred to the
trust.98
The IRS argued that Byrum had retained the right to designate who
enjoyed the income from the transferred property within the meaning of
section 2036(a)(2). 99 The IRS based this argument on the fact that Byrum
retained voting control over the corporations, and with such, he could select
the corporate directors.00 The IRS claimed that this power of selection
gave Byrum sufficient control over the directors so that he was able to
92. O'Malley, 383 U.S. at 631. The Court also noted that the grantor had the power to deny
"to the [income] beneficiaries the privilege of immediate enjoyment" of trust income. Id.
93. Id.
94. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 126.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 126-27.
97. Id. at 126.
98. Id. at 130. Each of the corporations had unrelated minority shareholders. Id.
99. Id. at 131-32.
100. Id. at 132.
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increase, decrease, or completely stop payments of corporate dividends. 10'
Therefore, "Byrum could 'regulate the flow of income to the trust' and
thereby shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment of trust income between the
current beneficiaries and the remaindermen."102 The IRS argued that this
ability to shift income was similar to the grantor's ability to shift income in
the O'Malley case and was tantamount to the right to designate who
enjoyed such income. 103
The Supreme Court disagreed with the IRS's analysis and determined
that Byrum did not retain a "right" to designate who possessed or enjoyed
the income from the transferred stock for purposes of section 2036(a)(2).1 04
The Supreme Court stated:
The term "right," certainly when used in a tax statute, must be
given its normal and customary meaning. It connotes an ascer-
tainable and legally enforceable power, such as that involved in
O'Malley. [footnote omitted] Here, the right ascribed to Byrum
was the power to use his majority position and influence over the
corporate directors to "regulate the flow of dividends" to the trust.
That "right" was neither ascertainable nor legally enforceable and
hence was not a right in any normal sense of that term. 105
The Supreme Court noted a number of factors that went into this de-
termination. First, the Supreme Court noted that the Trustee, not Byrum,
determined when income that flowed to the trust should be distributed to
Byrum's children.106 Second, the Supreme Court discussed how the right to
elect corporate directors is not the same as the legal right to control them. 107
To the contrary, a "majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty not to misuse
his power by promoting his personal interests at the expense of corporate
interests." 108 Finally, the Supreme Court noted that despite the fact that the
corporate directors have the legal right and power to declare dividends, their
discretion to do so "is subject to legal restraints." 09 Directors have a




104. Id. at 136-37.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 137.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 141.
110. Id. The Supreme Court discussed in detail the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.
[VOL. 80:41
2004] THE TAX COURT'S EXECUTION OF THE FAMILY ENTITY 59
"must balance the expectation of stockholders to reasonable dividends when
earned against corporate needs for retention of earnings. The first respon-
sibility of the board is to safeguard corporate financial viability for the long
term."'11 Decisions regarding payment of dividends must take into account
the economic realities associated with operating a business. 112  If the
directors disregard their fiduciary duty, they would be vulnerable to a
derivative suit. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]here were a substantial
number of minority stockholders in these corporations who were unrelated
to Byrum" and who could enforce their rights as minority shareholders.l13
Legal restraints on a legal right or power, such as the director's fiduciary
duty, "deprive the person exercising the power of a 'right' to do so" as that
term is used in section 2036.114
The Supreme Court analogized Byrum's retained powers to those
managerial powers that a grantor may retain over transferred assets without
causing such assets to be included in such grantor's gross estate.115
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that Byrum's ability "to affect,
but not control" the income from the transferred property was not equi-
valent to a right to designate who enjoyed the income therefrom. 16
After the Byrum case, individuals began establishing FLPs that they
controlled as general partners. These individuals would then transfer away
limited partnership interests (usually to family members) and rely on Byrum
to keep the FLP's underlying assets out of their gross estates. They based
their reliance on the fact that a general partner of a limited partnership owes
a fiduciary duty to the limited partnership and its limited partners that is
similar to the fiduciary duty the corporate directors owe to the corporation
11. Id. at 140.
112. Id. at 140-41.
113. Id. at 142.
114. Id. at 139 n.14.
115. Id. at 134.
116. The Supreme Court wisely pointed out that if majority ownership of a corporation is
tantamount to a right to designate who possesses or enjoys the income from the stock of such
corporation, a donor would never be able to give away stock for estate tax purposes if, after such
transfer, he still owned a majority of the shares in the company. Id. at 144. Recognizing that
inter vivos gifts are a generally accepted method of estate planning, the Supreme Court felt it
unfair to allow a decedent with marketable securities to take advantage of such planning while
restricting owners of closely held corporations from doing so. Id. It felt this was especially the
case since an estate that includes a closely held corporation is more likely to have a liquidity
problem than an estate that consists solely of marketable securities. Id. at 149 n.34. "The lan-
guage of the statute does not support such a result and we cannot believe Congress intended it to
have such discriminatory and far-reaching impact." Id.
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and its shareholders.' 17 Their position was that the fiduciary duty they
owed to the limited partners as the general partner restricted their power to
control distributions and was therefore not a legal right to designate under
section 2036(a)(2). For over 15 years, the IRS continually approved these
transactions in Private Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoran-
dums.l18 While these rulings did not have precedential value,1t 9 pro-
fessional practitioners relied on such rulings as generally accepted and
settled law given their numerous occurrences spread out over such a long
period of time. 120 As a result, the prevalence of family entities increased as
practitioners began recommending them to clients more frequently.121
Despite countless taxpayers utilizing such family entities, the Tax
Court ruled in 2003 that such family entities trigger section 2036(a)(2)
recapture.122 Prior to 2003, it was generally accepted by practitioners and
the IRS that family entities did not trigger section 2036(a)(2) recapture; the
case law after Byrum generally dealt with attacks on family entities under
section 2036(a)(1). Therefore, in order to show the proper development of
the case law with regard to section 2036(a), the Tax Court's recent ruling on
117. A long-standing tenet of partnership law is that a general partner owes a high standard
of conduct to his limited partners. Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil, 440 P.2d 978 (1968); see also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 1-401 to -406 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.99 to .104 (Michie 2002);
A.B. WILLIS, J.S. PENNELL, P.F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 1.05 (4th ed. 1989).
A general partner is bound by a strict fiduciary duty and cannot distribute or withhold distributions
from the partnership in contravention to the partnership agreement. See Bassan v. Inv. Exch.
Corp., 83 Wn.2d 922 (1974); Stallings v. White, 153 P.2d 813 (1944). A general partner will be
liable to his limited partners for breaches of such duty. See Reed v. Wood, 123 P.2d 275 (1942).
118. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15,
1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-021 (Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993).
119. I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (1986).
120. See Clay D. Geittmann, Using a Wyoming Close LLC Instead of a Traditional FLP 30
EST. PLAN. 608 (2003); Joseph C. Kempe, Estate and Personal Financial Planning, 3 EST. &
PERS. FIN. PLAN. § 27:02 (2003); Mario A. Mata, Use of FLPs and LLCs in Asset Protection
Planning, 18 No. 2 PRAC. TAX LAW. 15 (2004).
121. For example, both Estate of Strangi I and Thompson dealt with the "Fortress Plan," a
proprietary estate planning strategy developed by Fortress Financial Group, Inc. that utilized
FLPs. Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374, 376-377 (2002); Estate of Strangi v.
Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 480 (2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Fortress Plan purported that its primary advantages "were (1) lowering the taxable
value of the estate, (2) maximizing the preservation of assets, (3) reducing income
taxes by having the corporate general partner provide medical, retirement, and
'income splitting' benefits for family members, and (4) facilitating family and
charitable giving. In addition, [the Fortress Plan stated] that 'All of the benefits above
can be achieved while total control of all assets is retained by the directors of the
Corporate General Partner.'
Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at 376.
122. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1344 (2003).
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section 2036(a)(2) is discussed after the analysis of the Tax Court's
opinions addressing section 2036(a)(1).
B. SECTION 2036(a)(1)
The Supreme Court's determination that Byrum did not have the "right
to designate" under section 2036(a)(2) spoke to the legal form of the family
entity.123 Section 2036(a)(2) examines whether the form of the family en-
tity reserved in the donor-decedent the requisite control over how and when
the donees received transferred assets. 124 Conversely, section 2036(a)(1)
generally looks at the surrounding facts of how a family entity was man-
aged to see if a donor-decedent actually abided by his fiduciary duties or if
he abused his management power to retain certain benefits from the
transferred property for himself.125
Under section 2036(a)(1), property that a donor-decedent transferred
during his life is included in such donor-decedent's gross estate if he
retained: i) the possession of the property, ii) the enjoyment of the property,
or iii) the right to income from the property. 126 The "possession or en-
joyment" aspect of this section addresses more directly the original
intention of section 2036(a)-transfers that are testamentary in nature.
Section 2036(a)(1) mainly addresses the substance of a transaction. 127 It is
designed to prevent transfers, the substance of which retains in the donor-
decedent certain lifetime benefits from transferred property. 28 Accord-
ingly, in determining if a decedent retained such benefits from transferred
123. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 132-50 (1972).
124. Id.
125. Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 151-55 (2000); Thompson v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M.
(CCH) 374, 386-89 (2002); Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2857-58 (1997);
Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1647-48 (2002); Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1337-39.
126. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1986). The regulations for this section rephrase this test as the
retention of "[t]he use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the transferred
property." Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1960).
127. Section 2036(a)(1) also includes in a donor-decedent's gross estate assets in which the
donor-decedent retained the "right to income" from the transferred property. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
As discussed in Part IV.A above, a "right" must be legally enforceable and unrestricted. If it is
established that a donor-decedent has a legally enforceable and unrestricted right to income from
transferred property, then the donor-decedent clearly has retained the "substantial present eco-
nomic benefits" (i.e., enjoyment) from such transferred property. However, the converse is not
necessarily true. Therefore, the term "right to income" is a higher burden to establish than the
term "enjoyment" for section 2036(a)(1) to apply. Accordingly, the term "right to income' seems
to be superfluous language, which does not add to the 2036(a)(1) test.
128. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
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property, courts should focus on the substance of a transfer instead of its
form. 129
[The subsection] taxes not merely those interests which are
deemed to pass at death according to refined technicalities of the
law of property. It also taxes inter vivos transfers that are too
much akin to testamentary dispositions not to be subject to the
same excise, [citation omitted] and inter vivos gifts 'resorted to, as
a substitute for a will, in making dispositions of property operative
at death.130
The substantive test is one of facts and circumstances and looks at
whether the donor-decedent retained "possession or enjoyment" of the
transferred property. 131
"Possession" is a fairly simple concept that generally refers to tangible
property. 32 For example, a decedent "possessed" real estate when the
decedent retained the lifetime use of the real estate.133 The more complex
concept is "enjoyment." The Supreme Court has stated that "the terms 'en-
joy' and 'enjoyment,' as used in various estate tax statutes, 'are not terms of
art, but connote substantial present economic benefit rather than technical
vesting of title or estates."' 134
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section 2036(a)(1):
United States v. Byrum
In Byrum, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the
concept of "enjoyment."1 35 The IRS argued that Byrum retained the en-
joyment of the shares of stock transferred to the trust. 136 Byrum retained
the right to vote the shares of stock he transferred to the trust. 137 When
combined with his own shares, Byrum was able to vote at least 71% of the
129. Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 644 (1949).
130. Id. at 643 (quoting Hevlering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 112, 114 (1940)).
131. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 151-55; Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) at 386-89; Schauerhamer,
73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2857-58; Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1647-48; Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1337-39.
132. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 147 (1972).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 145 (quoting Comm'r v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946)).
135. See generally Byrum, 408 U.S. 125.
136. Id. at 145. The IRS's claim under section 2036(a)(1) was in the alternative to their
section 2036(a)(2) claim-that Byrum retained the right to designate who possessed and enjoyed
the income from the transferred property.
137. Id. at 127.
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shares in each corporation. 138 The IRS claimed that "where the cumulative
effect of the retained powers and the rights flowing from the shares not
placed in trust leaves the grantor in control of a close corporation, and
assures that control for his lifetime, he has retained the 'enjoyment' of the
transferred stock."' 39
The Supreme Court disagreed and found that the powers Byrum
reserved over the corporations were in the nature of the management
powers that the grantor reserved over the trust assets in Reinecke. 140 Such
management powers did not amount to the "right to designate" under
section 2036(a)(2).1 41 "Nor did the reserved powers of management of the
trusts save to decedent any control over the economic benefits or the
enjoyment of the property" under section 2036(a)(1). 142
The Supreme Court held that Byrum's power to manage the
corporations was restricted by his fiduciary duty and that of the directors.143
Byrum could not vest himself with the transferred property's substantial
present economic benefits without a breach of his and the directors'
fiduciary duties.4 Therefore, if Byrum and the directors did not breach
their fiduciary duties, any control Byrum had over the corporations did not
amount to "enjoyment" of the stock. 45 As such, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the form of the entity in Byrum did not trigger section 2036(a)(1)
recapture. 146
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court implied that if, based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, Byrum exercised control over the corporations
such that he retained the substantial present economic benefit of the
corporations (i.e., he and the directors violated their fiduciary duties), he
could have retained "enjoyment" of the stock within the meaning of section
2036(a)(1).147 The Supreme Court used Byrum's potential compensation to
make its point.148 As an employee of the corporations, Byrum would be
entitled to compensation. However, "[tihere is no showing that his control
of these corporations gave him an 'enjoyment' with respect to
138. Id. at 126-27.
139. Id. at 145.
140. Id. at 146.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 150.
144. Id. at 137-38.
145. Id. at 150.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 150 n.36.
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compensation that he would not have had upon rendering similar services
without owning any stock."149
2. Congressional Response to Byrum: Section 2036(b)
Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision in Byrum.15o In
1976, the Committee on Ways and Means discussed the then recent Byrum
case in a report to Congress.'15 The report stated that the "committee be-
lieves that voting rights are so significant with respect to corporate stock
that the retention of voting rights by a donor should be treated as the
retention of the enjoyment of stock for estate tax purposes."152 Thereafter,
Congress amended section 2036 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 by adding a
new subsection (b).153 Section 2036(b) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) VOTING RIGHTS -
(1) IN GENERAL - For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the
retention of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares of stock
of a controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of
the enjoyment of transferred property.
(2) CONTROLLED CORPORATION - For purposes of paragraph
(1), a corporation shall be treated as a controlled corporation if, at
any time after the transfer of the property and during the 3-year
period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent
owned (with the application of section 318), or had the right
(either alone or in conjunction with any person) to vote stock
possessing at least 20 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock.154
a. The Impact of Section 2036(b) on 2036(a)
Congress did not appear to disagree with the Supreme Court's opinion
in Byrum with regard to its analysis of how sections 2036(a)(1) or (2)
149. Id.
150. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380 at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3419.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 1) 1, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1978, section 702(i), 1978-3
C.B. (Vol) 1, 165.
154. I.R.C. § 2036(b) (1986). Section 2036(b) also includes paragraph (3) with reads as
follows: "(3) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 2035. - For purposes of applying section 2035 with
respect to paragraph (1), the relinquishment or cessation of voting rights shall be treated as a
transfer of property made by the decedent." Id.
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should be applied to transferred assets.155 Congress merely made a very
narrow change to how the term "enjoyment" should be defined.156 Under
section 2036(b), the term "enjoyment" now includes the retention of voting
rights of stock for corporations in which the donor has at least 20% of the
total voting rights.157 Section 2036(b) does not speak to section 2036(a)(2)
(i.e. the right to designate). It also should not affect any of the Supreme
Court's analyses with regard to section 2036(a)(1) except in the specific
fact scenario where voting rights of a controlled corporation are retained as
part of a transfer of stock.
The IRS and the Tax Court have expressly acknowledged the limited
impact that section 2036(b) has on section 2036(a).158 In addition, the
Senate Finance Committee expressed its opinion that section 2036(b) did
not apply to a situation analogous to a transfer of a limited partnership
interest or an interest in a manager-managed LLC.159 The committee
remarked:
The rule would not apply to the transfer of stock in a controlled
corporation where the decedent could not vote the transferred
stock. For example, where a decedent transfers stock in a con-
trolled corporation to his son and does not have the power to vote
the stock any time during the three year period before his death,
the rule does not apply even where the decedent owned, or could
vote, a majority of the stock. Similarly, where the decedent owned
both voting and nonvoting stock and transferred the nonvoting
stock to another person, the rule does not apply to the nonvoting
stock simply because of the decedent's ownership of the voting
stock. 160
b. One Judge's Opinion: Kimbell v. U.S.
Despite the clear impact of section 2036(b) on the Byrum decision,
Judge Buchmeyer of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, Wichita Falls Division, recently opined that section
155. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3419.
156. I.R.C. § 2036(b).
157. Id.
158. Rev. Rul. 81-15, 1981-1 C.B. 457; Daniels v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1310, 1318
n.8 (1994).
159. A manager who is chosen by a LLC's members runs the day-to-day operations of a
manager-managed LLC. Conversely, LLC members run the day-to-day operations of a member-
managed LLC.
160. S. REP. No. 95-745, at 91 (1978) (emphasis added).
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2036(b) overruled the Supreme Court's fiduciary duty analysis in Byrum. 161
In Kimbell v. United States,162 Kimbell owned a 50% interest in a manager-
managed LLC.163 Her son and daughter-in-law owned the other 50% and
her son acted as the sole manager.' 64 Kimbell and the LLC formed a
limited partnership in which the LLC served as the 1% general partner and
Kimbell served as the 99% limited partner. 165
Kimbell's son, the plaintiff, claimed that under Byrum, Kimbell's
fiduciary duties limited her 'right to designate' under section 2036(a)(2) as
well as her control for the purposes of retention of 'enjoyment' under
section 2036(a)(1).166 Judge Buchmeyer, however, dismissed this argument
stating, "Byrum, is not only distinguishable on its facts from our case, but
was expressly overruled by Congressional enactment of section 2036(b)."167
Judge Buchmeyer's interpretation of section 2036(b) is completely at
odds with the interpretation of section 2036(b) by the IRS, the Tax Court,
and the legislature who have all acknowledged that section 2036(b) only
alters section 2036(a)(1) in a very limited manner with regard to closely
held corporations. The family entity in question in Kimbell is an LLC and,
therefore, section 2036(b) is completely inapplicable to an analysis of
whether section 2036(a)(1) applies in this case. Moreover, section 2036(b)
does not speak to section 2036(a)(2) at all.168 Accordingly, Judge
Buchmeyer's belief that section 2036(b) completely overruled the Byrum
decision with regard to sections 2036(a)(1) and (a)(2) is clearly wrong.
Nevertheless, there is a fear, given the precedential weight of district court
decisions, that other judges may perpetuate his opinion. 169
161. Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003) rev'd on other grounds,
2004 WL 1119598 (5th Cir. 2004).
162. 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003) rev'd on other grounds, 2004 WL 1119598 (5th
Cir. 2004).
163. Kimbell, 244 F. Supp. 2d. at 702.
164. Id.
165. Id. Kimbell's interest in the LP was owned through her revocable living trust. Id.
166. Id. at 705.
167. Id.
168. I.R.C. § 2036(b).
169. In May of 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overruled
Judge Buchmeyer's opinion on different grounds. Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004
WL 1119598, at *13 (5th Cir. 2004). As such, it is unlikely that this aspect of his opinion will be
appealed.
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3. The Tax Court's Interpretation of Section 2036(a)(1):
Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner-
The First Signs of Trouble.
Over the past several years, the Tax Court has had a number of
opportunities to shape its analysis of section 2036(a)(1). In 1997, the Tax
Court issued a Memorandum Opinion in the case of Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner.170 Schauerhamer established three FLPs,
one for each of her children. 171 In each partnership she was a 95% limited
partner and a 1% general partner.172 Each of her children was a 4% general
partner of their respective FLPs.173 Each partnership agreement named
Schauerhamer as the managing partner and gave her "full power to manage
and conduct the Partnership's business operation in its usual course."1 74
The partnership agreements also provided for allocations of profits and
losses and required that all partnership income be deposited in partnership
accounts. 175
Schauerhamer "transferred some of her business assets, in undivided
one-third shares, to the partnerships. The assets included real estate,
partnership interests and notes receivable."176 She then assigned sixty-six
$10,000 interests in the FLPs to various family members.1 77 In managing
the partnerships, Schauerhamer deposited into a personal account "all
partnership income and income from other sources. She did not maintain
any records to account separately for partnership and nonpartnership funds.
Decedent utilized the account as her personal checking account, and from
this account she paid personal and partnership expenses."178
The Tax Court held that the FLPs' assets fell within section
2036(a)(1).179 In doing so, it discussed in detail how it applied section
2036(a)(1)'s facts and circumstances test which was only briefly referred to
in Byrum. First, the Tax Court reiterated that "[e]njoyment as used in the
death tax statute is not a term of art, but is synonymous with substantial
170. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997).






177. Id. at 2856-57. The $660,000 (66 x $10,000) in assignments was designed to take
advantage of Schauerhamer's annual exclusion for gift tax purposes, avoiding transfer taxes on the
assigned interests altogether. Id.
178. Id. at 2857.
179. Id. at 2858.
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present economic benefit." 80 It then explained the rule that "[r]etained
enjoyment may exist where there is an express or implied understanding at
the time of the transfer that the transferor will retain the economic benefits
of the property. [citation omitted] The understanding need not be legally
enforceable to trigger section 2036(a)(1)."181 "Whether there was an im-
plied agreement is a question of fact to be determined with reference to the
facts and circumstances of the transfer and the subsequent use of the
property." 8 2 The Tax Court then discussed the facts of the case that were
evidence of such an agreement-the retention of the transferred property's
income stream and the commingling of assets. 183 It ultimately determined
that Schauerhamer had entered into an implied agreement with her children
that she would retain the enjoyment of the transferred property. Therefore,
the value of all the property she transferred to the FLPs, despite the sixty-
six assignments, was included in her gross estate under section
2036(a)(1). 184
The facts of Schauerhamer made the Tax Court's decision easy.
Schauerhamer, in complete contravention of the partnership agreements,
absconded with the partnerships' income for her personal use. 185 She took
much more than she was entitled to and did not limit herself by any
fiduciary duty she owed to her partners.1 86 In other words, she used (or
more accurately abused) her "control" of the FLPs in such a manner that
she retained the substantial present economic benefit of the FLPs' assets.
Accordingly, the Tax Court's application of section 2036(a)(1) in
Schauerhamer does not contradict Byrum.
The Tax Court considered Schauerhamer's retention of the income
from the transferred property as strong evidence of the retention of the "en-
joyment" of the property.187 Such a rule does not directly contradict Byrum.
However, for the rule to be consistent with Byrum, an arrangement in which
the donor-decedent received income proportionate to his interest in a family
180. Id. (quoting McNichol's Estate v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1959)).
181. Id. The Tax Court recognizes that "enjoyment" refers to the "substantial present
economic benefit" of the assets in question. Id. However, it uses the term "economic benefit"
instead of "substantial present economic benefit" when discussing the implied agreement rule. Id.
It is not clear whether the Tax Court was paraphrasing or if it is suggesting that the implied
agreement to retain "economic benefits" (a presumably lower standard) is tantamount to the
higher standard of "substantial present economic benefits."
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2857-58.
184. Id. at 2858.
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entity should not be evidence of an agreement that such donor-decedent
retained the substantial present economic benefits (i.e., enjoyment) from the
transferred property. Such an arrangement is an appropriate form for a
family entity and should be respected under Byrum. If it was not, strong
evidence of retention of enjoyment would exist almost every time a donor-
decedent did not transfer away 100% of his or her interest in a transferred
entity as such donor-decedent would, at some point, likely receive income
from their remaining interest. As the Supreme Court noted in Byrum, such
gift giving is a generally accepted method of estate planning.188 Therefore,
the receipt of income from a family entity should only be used as evidence
of retention of enjoyment of transferred property when the facts of the case
show that the donor-decedent received more than his pro rata share of
income. 189
The Tax Court stated in Schauerhamer that "[w]here a decedent's
relationship to transferred assets remains the same as it was before the
transfer, section 2036(a)(1) requires that the value of the assets be included
in the decedent's gross estate." 190 The concern that begins with this case is
how the Tax Court determines whether a donor-decedent's relationship to
transferred assets has changed. Intentionally or not, the Tax Court used the
interpretation of this rule as well as other lines of reasoning, as seen in the
following cases, to stem what it perceived as valuation discount abuses in
family entities. As will be discussed in detail below, such an application of
section 2036(a)(1) is inconsistent with that code section's purpose as well
as the Supreme Court's opinion in Byrum.
4. The Tax Court's Interpretation of Section 2036(a)(1):
Reichardt v. Commissioner-Further Steps Away From Byrum
a. The Facts
In 2000, the Tax Court issued the oft-cited opinion of Reichardt v.
Commissioner.' 91 The decedent, Reichardt, formed a FLP in June of 1993
188. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 149 n.34 (1972).
189. Id. at 150. Partnerships do not have to allocate profits and losses pro rata. They only
need to do so in a manner that has substantial economic effect (SEE) within the meaning of sec-
tion 704(b) and the regulations thereto. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1986). It may be possible to have a
partnership allocate profits and losses with SEE while at the same time reserving in the donor-
partner substantial economic benefit over the transferred assets.
190. Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858 (1997).
191. 114 T.C. 144 (2000).
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between his revocable living trust and his two children.192 At the time of
his death (August 1994), Reichardt's trust owned a 1% general partnership
interest and a 36.46% limited partnership interest in the FLP. 193 His
children owned the remaining 62.54% of the FLP as limited partners.
94
Reichardt "transferred all of his property (except for his car, personal
effects, and a small amount of cash) to the partnership," including cash,
brokerage accounts, his personal residence, and several real estate
investment properties. 
95
In July and August of 1993, shortly after the FLP was formed,
Reichardt "deposited $20,540 of partnership funds in his personal checking
account; ... [o]n August 13, 1993, decedent transferred $32,871.78 [which
presumably included the $20,540] from his two personal checking accounts
... to a new partnership account." 196 Reichardt "used at least $8,116 of
partnership funds in 1993 for personal purposes and $13,507 in 1994."197
Additionally, Reichardt never paid rent to the FLP for use of his personal
residence. 198
b. The Tax Court's Analysis
The Tax Court addressed the issue of whether the FLP's assets were
includable in Reichardt's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1). The Tax
Court first reviewed the rule regarding express or implied agreements
discussed above.199 It then went on to say that "[pletitioner bears the bur-
den (which is especially onerous for transactions involving family
members) of proving that an implied agreement or understanding between
the decedent and his children did not exist."200 In analyzing the facts to
determine if Reichardt had an express or implied agreement with his
children that he would retain the economic benefits of the FLP's underlying
assets, the Tax Court focused on four main factors-continuity of asset
192. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 147.
193. Id. at 150.
194. Id. at 147, 150.
195. Id. at 148.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 154.
198. Id. at 149.
199. Id. at 151. Interestingly, the Tax Court refers to an agreement for the retention of the
"present economic benefits" in reviewing this rule. Id. Nowhere in the opinion is the phrase
"substantial present economic benefits," which the Supreme Court defined as "enjoyment." See
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1972).
200. Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 151-52 (2000).
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management, commingling of assets, personal use of partnership assets, and
contribution of a majority of Reichardt's assets.201
The Tax Court noted, "[d]ecedent controlled and managed, or allowed
the co-owners to control and manage, the partnership assets in the same
manner both before and after he transferred them to the partnership. He
used the same brokers and managers before and after he transferred the
property." 202 The Tax Court found that due to this management continuity,
"[d]ecedent's relationship to the partnership assets did not change when he
conveyed them to the trust and partnership." 203
Reichardt deposited $20,540 into his personal account, which he later
transferred to a partnership account. 204 Therefore, the Tax Court noted that
"[d]ecedent commingled partnership and personal funds."205 Additionally,
the Tax Court pointed to the fact that Reichardt used partnership assets for
his personal use. "He used the partnership's checking account as his per-
sonal account. He lived at [his personal residence] without paying rent
before or after he transferred it to the ... partnership." 206 Based on these
facts, the Tax Court again found that "[d]ecedent's relationship to the assets
at issue remained the same after he transferred them."207
The Tax Court then addressed the estate's defense that Reichardt "had
no relationship to any of the real property except for [his personal residence
and one rental property] because [others] managed those properties." 208 It
disregarded the estate's claim by stating that "[slection 2036 applies not
only if a transferor retains possession or enjoyment of property, but also if a
transferor retains the right to income from the property. [citation omitted]
We believe that decedent and his children had an implied agreement that
decedent could retain for his lifetime the right to the income from all of the
real property that the partnership had when decedent died."209
The Tax Court also mentioned that Reichardt contributed nearly all of
his property to the FLP.210 The Tax Court implied that Reichardt would not
make such a transfer unless he knew he would have access to the
transferred assets. The transfer of nearly all of Reichardt's assets "suggests
201. Id. at 151-53.
202. Id. at 149.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 148.
205. Id. at 152.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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that decedent had an implied agreement with his children that he could
continue to use those assets." 211
Based on all of the above, the Tax Court concluded "that decedent and
his children had an implied agreement that decedent could continue to
possess and enjoy the assets and retain the right to the income from the
assets that he conveyed to the partnership during his lifetime."
212
Accordingly, the Tax Court included all such assets in Reichardt's gross
estate under section 2036(a)(1). 21
3
c. The Concerns with the Tax Court's Analysis
Reichardt's personal use of the FLP's assets (e.g., use of FLP funds for
personal purposes and use of his personal residence without paying rent),
may have warranted inclusion of the FLP's assets in Reichardt's gross
estate under section 2036(a)(1). Nevertheless, the Tax Court's opinion is
troubling for a number of reasons. First, the standard of proof set in this
case appears to be an impossible burden to meet in the family setting as the
taxpayer must prove a negative-that an implied agreement does not exist.
If the taxpayer cannot prove that an implied agreement did not exist, then it
is presumed that one did exist and the family entity's underlying assets are
included in the donor-decedent's gross estate. It does not seem likely that
evidence of a FLP operated completely within a form acceptable under
Byrum would meet this "onerous" (as the Tax Court termed) burden. Such
a rule completely undermines the Supreme Court's decision in Byrum, i.e.,
that the form of a family entity will not cause estate tax inclusion, by
making it virtually impossible to prove that the form was followed.
The Tax Court's focus on Reichardt's management of the FLP does not
seem to be consistent with Byrum either. The Tax Court clearly implied
that if a donor-decedent managed assets after a transfer to a family entity in
the same manner as he did before the transfer his relationship to those assets
never changed. 214 The rationale of applying section 2036(a)(1) based on a
continuation of management misses the point the Supreme Court made in
211. Id.
212. Id. at 155.
213. Id. at 158.
214. In reviewing the facts of the Schauerhamer case in Reichardt, the Tax Court stated that
"the children testified that they intended the decedent's relationship with the transferred assets to
remain the same after the transfer." Id. at 156. However, the Schauerhamer case states that the
children testified that "[t]he assets and income would be managed by decedent exactly as they had
been managed in the past." Estate of Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855, 2858
(1997). This is another example of the Tax Court's failure to distinguish between a change in a
decedent's relationship to transferred assets and a change in the decedent's management of assets.
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Byrum, i.e., that the donor's relationship to transferred assets changes by
virtue of the fact that he is bound by a fiduciary duty to the family entity
and his co-owners. Simply because a donor-decedent continued to directly
manage assets or use the same asset managers as he had before a transfer to
a family entity does not mean that his relationship to the assets has stayed
the same.215 Furthermore, such a rule only serves to encourage donors to
change from proven management techniques and successful managers to
untested ones.
In addition, the Tax Court's ruling that Reichardt had an implied
agreement with his children to a right to the income from the real estate,
directly contradicts Byrum. Recall that the rule the Tax Court stated in
Schauerhamer and initially in Reichardt referred to a decedent retaining the
"enjoyment" of transferred property through an implied agreement to retain
the economic benefits from such property, a rule consistent with Byrum.216
Here, however, the Tax Court refers to an implied agreement to a "right to
income." 217 As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Byrum went to
great lengths to explain the term "right" in the context of an estate tax
statute. The Supreme Court specifically said that a "right" must be a
"legally enforceable power." 218 The Supreme Court's definition of the term
"right" is directly at odds with the Tax Court's. The Tax Court stated that
an implied agreement that the transferor would retain a "right" to income
from transferred property did not have to be "legally enforceable." 21 9
215. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently found the lack of
change in the management of transferred assets to be "irrelevant" in determining if the exception
to section 2036(a) for a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration applied. Kimbell v.
United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598 at *9 (5th Cir. 2004). Hopefully, the Fifth
Circuit will use similar reasoning when determining if sections 2036(a)(1) or (2) apply to a given
transaction.
216. This rule is only consistent if "economic benefit" or "present economic benefit," as used
by the Tax Court in their implied agreement rule, is the same as "substantial present economic
benefit," used by the Supreme Court to define "enjoyment."
217. Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 153 (2000).
218. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972).
219. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 151. The regulations for section 2036(a) state that "[a]n interest
or right is treated as having been retained or reserved if at the time of the transfer there was an
understanding, express or implied, that the interest or right would later be conferred." Treas. Reg.
20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1960). Therefore, the Tax Court seems to be following the IRS's
regulation that says that such a right may be implied instead of the Supreme Court, which says
that such a right must be legally enforceable. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 136-37.
It should be noted that a donor-decedent would have an express agreement to retain the
enjoyment from transferred property if a fight to income were established. Therefore, if the Tax
Court found as such, its opinion would not contradict Byrum. However, the Tax Court never sug-
gests that Reichardt had a legally enforceable right to the income from the transferred property,
and the facts of the case do not support such an inference. To the contrary, the Tax Court clearly
is referring to an unenforceable implied agreement. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 15 1.
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The Tax Court also relied on the fact that Reichardt transferred most of
his assets to the FLP.220 However, such a fact by itself should not be evi-
dence of an implied agreement. It must be supported by other facts that
show that a donor-decedent needed or expected to receive assets in excess
of his proportionate share of the reasonable distributions from such an
entity. For example, if a donor-decedent's proportionate share of a family
entity's underlying assets is $2,000,000 and the donor-decedent lived off of
$40,000 per year, it may be completely reasonable for him to expect at least
a 2% return on his investment (i.e., $40,000) for him to live on.
Instead of focusing on Reichardt's proper management of FLP assets,
an implied agreement to a "right to income," and his contribution of most of
his assets to the FLP, the Tax Court should have focused more on his
personal use of FLP assets.221 For example, Reichardt stayed in his home
after it was transferred to the FLP and never paid rent.222 As the Supreme
Court discussed in Byrum, a decedent has 'possession' of real property
when he retains use of that property for his life. Reichardt clearly pos-
sessed his home within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1). The facts that
Reichardt possessed his residence and used the FLP's checking account as
his personal account should be considered strong evidence that there was an
implied agreement that Reichardt would retain the economic benefits of the
other assets transferred to the FLP as well. Nevertheless, the Tax Court
continued to establish precedent it could use in future cases when the Tax
Court wants to disallow valuation discounts it perceives as abusive and the
donor-decedent's actions as well as the form of the family entity are
acceptable under Byrum. 223
After Reichardt, the Tax Court, in its Memorandum Opinions,
continued to apply section 2036(a)(1) inconsistently with Byrum. Two such
cases were Harper v. Commissioner224 and Thompson v. Commissioner.225
220. Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 153.
221. The Tax Court also puts great weight on the fact that Reichardt deposited $20,540 into
his personal account, even though he returned it shortly thereafter. Id. at 148. Given Reichardt's
other transgressions, such a fact seems minor and undeserving of the attention it received.
222. Id. at 152.
223. It is not clear whether the Tax Court intentionally created precedent to stem valuation
discount abuses in the future. However, the resulting precedent is established regardless of the
Tax Court's intentions.
224. 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 (2002). The Tax Court issued Harper v. Comm'r in 2002, a
Memorandum Opinion in which it continued to stray from Byrum. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH)
1641. Harper was in poor health and formed a FLP with his son and daughter as part of his estate
plan. Id. at 1642, 1645. Harper owned his partnership interests through a revocable living trust.
Id. at 1642. Initially, Harper owned a 99% limited partnership interest, his son owned a 0.6%
general partnership interest, and his daughter owned a 0.4% general partnership interest. Id.
Harper's son was designated the managing general partner. Id. Harper then contributed almost all
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of his assets to the FLP. Id. at 1643-44. During the first three months of the FLP's existence, all
income from the FLP's assets was deposited into Harper's personal account. Id. at 1645. In July
of 1994, Harper assigned his son a 24% limited partnership interest and his daughter a 36%
limited partnership interest. Id. at 1644. Harper retained the remaining 39% limited partnership
interest. Id. Concurrently with the assignments to his children, Harper "reclassified... [his] 39%
limited partnership interest as a 'Class A Limited Partnership Interest' which was entitled to 39%
of the entity's income and losses and to a 'Guaranteed Payment' of '4.25%' annually of its Capital
Account balance." Id. The 60% limited partnership interests he gave to his children "were
designated as "Class B Limited Partnership Interest[s]" and were entitled to 60% of the income
and loss of the entity." Id. While Harper was alive, distributions from the FLP were propor-
tionate, with the exception of two distributions made immediately before his death totaling about
$11,000. Id. at 1645. After Harper died, the FLP distributed over $200,000 to Harper's estate
without concurrent distributions to his children. Id.
The Tax Court stated the following:
Section 2036 mandates inclusion in the gross estate of transferred property with
respect to which the decedent retained, by express or implied agreement, possession,
control, enjoyment, or the right to income. The focus here is on whether there existed
an implicit agreement that decedent would retain control or enjoyment, i.e., economic
benefit, of the assets he transferred to the [FLP].
Id. at 1648 (emphasis added). To determine if such an agreement existed, the Tax Court looked at
a number of factors. First, the Tax Court found that in managing the FLP, Harper's son
disregarded his fiduciary duty to the FLP and the other partners with regard to distributions to
Harper. Id. at 1649. The Tax Court pointed out that "[t]he more salient feature is not that
[Harper's son] did or did not have authority to make the distributions but that he frequently used
his position to place partnership funds at [Harper's] disposal in response to personal or estate
needs. No other partner was afforded the same luxury of 'additional' distributions or capital
returns." Id. at 1651. (The Tax Court did not address whether Harper's retention of a guaranteed
4.25% annual return of capital was retention of enjoyment within the meaning of Section
2036(a)(1).) The Tax Court also noted that Harper commingled his funds with the FLP's in
contravention of the partnership agreement. Id.
"The Agreement specified: 'All funds of the Partnership shall be deposited in a separate bank
account or accounts.' Yet no such account was even opened for [the FLP] until ... more than 3
months after the entity began its legal existence. Prior to that time, partnership income was
deposited in [Harper's personal] account, resulting in an unavoidable commingling of funds. Id.
at 1649.
The Tax Court then focused on what it called "testamentary characteristics of the partnership
arrangement." Id. at 1651. It looked to these testamentary characteristics as evidence of an
implied agreement. Id. at 1651-52. The Tax Court likened the FLP to an estate plan. Id. at 1652.
It noted that Harper "made all decisions regarding the creation and structure of the partnership"
and that one of the reasons he set up the FLP was to protect his daughter's inheritance from her
creditors. Id. In addition, the Tax Court observed:
The fact that the contributed property constituted the majority of decedent's assets,
including nearly all of his investments, is also not at odds with what one would expect
to be the prime concern of an estate plan. We additionally take note of decedent's
advanced age, serious health conditions, and experience as an attorney.
Id.
Based on the commingling of the assets, disproportionate distributions and what it termed as
testamentary characteristics, the Tax Court found that Harper "retained the enjoyment of the
contributed property within the meaning of section 2036(a)." Id.
The facts of the Harper case may justify inclusion of the FLP's assets in his gross estate under
section 2036(a)(1), although it is far from clear. Harper's son commingled FLP funds with
Harper's for the first three months of the FLP's existence. Id. at 1649. In addition, immediately
before his death, Harper received about $11,000 from the FLP as a return of capital. Id. at 1645.
Therefore, it is at least arguable that there was an implied agreement that Harper would retain the
economic benefits from the transferred assets.
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However, the concern with the Harper opinion is not the outcome of the case, but the Tax
Court's reasoning. To begin with, the Tax Court includes an implied agreement for "control" as a
reason to include the underlying assets from a family entity in a donor-decedent's gross estate
under section 2036(a)(1). Id. at 1648. Including a donor-decedent's mere power to "control" a
family entity as a reason for triggering section 2036(a)(1) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court,
which ruled that a donor-decedent's fiduciary duties prevented mere control from being deemed
retention of enjoyment of transferred assets. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 150
(1972) (holding that retention of control was not retention of enjoyment of the property). Abuse
of control may be evidence of enjoyment, but control itself should not cause inclusion in a donor-
decedent's gross estate.
The Tax Court emphasizes the disproportionate distributions Harper and his estate received.
Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1651. However, this reliance may be misplaced. An implied
agreement that triggers section 2036(a)(1) must have been made at the time of the transfer to the
FLP. Otherwise, it was not retained. Harper was probably not competent when the two dis-
tributions (one of which was made the day before he died) totaling $11,000 were made. Id. at
1645. If Harper was not competent and not the one orchestrating the distributions, it is ques-
tionable whether such distributions should be evidence that Harper entered into an implied
agreement at the time of the transfer to the FLP. There is no evidence of any uneven distributions
while Harper was competent, and he certainly had nothing to do with the more significant
distributions that were made after his death. To the contrary, the distributions seemed to be for the
ultimate benefit of his children and were controlled by his son.
The Tax Court's focus on the partnership agreement's testamentary characteristics is also
troubling. Id. at 1651. The Tax Court noted the fact that Harper's son was managing the in-
vestments in a manner similar to how Harper managed his investments before he contributed them
to the FLP. Id. at 1652. This rationale is similar to that of Reichardt in which the Tax Court
implied that if the manner in which a donor-decedent's assets are invested does not change after
they are contributed to a family entity, the donor-decedent's relationship to such assets does not
change. See Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 152-53 (2000) (noting similarities between the
two periods). As the Tax Court has repeatedly said, such continuous management is evidence of
an implied agreement that the donor-decedent will retain the enjoyment of transferred property.
As previously stated, not only does such a rationale conflict with the Byrum case, but it also
encourages a change of investment management from the proven method that the donor-decedent
used in the past to a new and untested investment strategy. In addition, the other "testamentary
characteristics" the Tax Court relied on (e.g., transferred a majority of his assets, his age, and his
health) do not seem to have anything to do with whether a family entity has a viable form under
Byrum.
225. 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 34 (2002). In 2002, the Tax Court issued the Memorandum Opinion
Thompson v. Commissioner. Thompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 34. The decedent, Thompson, set up
two FLPs-one for his son (Son FLP) and one for his daughter (Daughter FLP). Id. at 376-77.
Both FLPs had corporate general partners. Id. Thompson contributed property worth about
$1,412,000 to Son FLP and his son contributed property worth about $832,000. Id. at 378-79.
Thompson owned 62.27% of Son FLP, his son owned 36.72%, and its corporate general partner
owned 1.01%. Id. at 379. Thompson and his son were both officers of the corporate general
partner and each of them held 49% of its shares. Id. at 378. An unrelated third party held the
remaining 2% of the shares. Id.
Thompson also contributed property worth about $1,410,000 to Daughter FLP, and his
daughter's husband contributed property worth about $50,000. Id. at 377-78. Thompson owned
95.4% of Daughter FLP, daughter's husband owned 3.54%, and its corporate general partner
owned 1.06%. Id. at 377. Thompson, his daughter, and her husband were all officers of the
corporate general partner. Id. Thompson held 49% of its shares, his daughter and her husband
each held 24.5% of its shares, and a charity was given the remaining 2% of its shares. Id.
Thompson contributed almost all of his assets to the two FLPs. Id. at 381. He or his estate
received distributions from the FLPs whenever he needed funds for living expenses, for taxes, to
make Christmas gifts, etc. Id. at 379-80. Moreover, at the time these entities were being formed,
Thompson's children sought assurances from the Fortress Financial Group, Inc. (the company that
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5. The Tax Court's Interpretation of Section 2036(a)(1)-
Strangi v. Commissioner
a. The Facts
In 2000, the Tax Court issued its opinion in Strangi 1.226 Strangi
owned a 99% limited partnership interest in an FLP, and Stranco, a
corporation, owned a 1% general partnership interest in the FLP.227
Strangi's children owned a 52% interest in Stranco, Strangi owned a 47%
interest and an independent charity owned the other 1%.228
Strangi acted at all times through his attorney-in-fact and son-in-law,
Mr. Gulig, who managed Strangi's finances. 229 Strangi and his four child-
ren made up the board of directors of Stranco.230 The board of directors
hired Mr. Gulig, in his individual capacity, to manage the day-to-day opera-
tions of the FLP and Stranco.231 Strangi contributed almost $10,000,000 to
marketed the use of FLPs to Thompson as part of the "Fortress Plan") that Thompson would have
access to FLP funds for his needs. Id. at 379. The Tax Court determined that Thompson had an
express or implied agreement with his children that he would receive funds from the FLP as
needed. Id. at 386. As such, it ruled that Thompson had retained the enjoyment of the property he
transferred. Id. The Tax Court focused on the following fact:
Decedent's outright transfer of the vast bulk of his assets to the partnerships would
have deprived him of the assets needed for his own support. Thus, the transfers from
the partnerships to decedent can only be explained if decedent had at least an implied
understanding that his children would agree to his requests for money from the assets
he contributed to the partnership, and that they would do so for as long as he lived.
Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
The Tax Court may have been correct about the implied agreement. Such an agreement is
evidenced by the timing of distributions and the assurances sought by Thompson's children with
regard to being able to distribute Thompson's funds. But to say that a contribution of most of
one's assets to a family entity can "only" be explained by an implied agreement is a bit
unreasonable. In this case, Thompson's "lifestyle was simple" and his expenses were about
$57,000 per year. Id. at 380. He received income of about $14,000 a year from social security
and annuities. Id. at 376. Therefore, he needed about $43,000 ($57,000 - $14,000) per year to
maintain his standard of living. Thompson contributed over $2,800,000 worth of assets to the
FLPs. It would not have been unreasonable for him to expect at least a minimal return on his
investment of about 1.5 % to cover his shortfall for living expenses. Accordingly, a contribution
of most of a decedent's assets to a family entity may be a factor to consider in determining if an
implied agreement exists. However, if a decedent had sufficient income to maintain his standard
of living, including a reasonable return on his interest in the family entity, such a factor should be
given minimal weight.
226. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 293
F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
227. Id. at 481.
228. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1334 (2003).
229. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 479-80.
230. Id. at 481.
231. Id. at 482.
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the FLP and his children contributed about $56,000 to Stranco for their 53%
interest therein. 232
Strangi's contribution consisted of about 98% of his assets and in-
cluded his personal residence.233 The FLP accrued rent on the residence
"and reported the rental income on its 1994 income tax return;" but the rent
was not actually paid until January 1997.234
At the time of his death, Strangi owned, outside of the FLP, about
$172,000 in liquifiable assets and had $762 in the bank. 235 He was also
receiving about $3,000 a month from a pension and Social Security. 236 At
the time the FLP was created, Strangi had a life expectancy of one to two
years, but he only lived about two months. 237 The FLP made several
distributions to or on behalf of Strangi and his estate, including the payment
for back surgery for one of Strangi's caregivers, the payment of funeral
expenses, estate administration expenses and related debts, distributions for
a bequest to Strangi's sister, and a distribution of over $3,000,000 to cover
Strangi's estate taxes. 238 Whenever such a distribution was made, a
proportionate distribution was made to Stranco.239 All of the parties to the
FLP followed the entity formalities. "[T]he proverbial 'i's were dotted' and
't's were crossed'." 240
As of Strangi's date of death, the value of the FLP's assets was over
$11,100,000.241 Strangi's estate valued its interests in the FLP at less than
$6,600,000 after applying a 33% valuation discount based on lack of con-
trol and lack of marketability. 242 His estate also had over $260,000 worth
of other assets.243
232. Id. at 481. Strangi's daughter, Mrs. Gulig, purchased the 53% interest in Stranco "for
$55,650 on behalf of herself and her three siblings (with each thereby acquiring a 13.25-percent
interest)." Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1334. "There after, each of the four children
gave a .25-percent interest in Stranco of McLennan Community College Foundation... , and the
charity became a -percent shareholder in the corporation." Id. at 1335.
233. Id. at 1334.
234. Id. at 1335.
235. Id. at 1338.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1333, 1335. "During 1993, decedent had surgery to remove a cancerous mass
from his back; was diagnosed with supranuclear palsy (a brain disorder that would gradually
reduce his ability to speak, walk, and swallow); and had prostate surgery." Id. at 1333.
238. Id. at 1335.
239. Id.
240. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 486 (2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
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b. The Rulings in Strangi I and Strangi II
As discussed in Part II above, the IRS argued that the valuation
discount should not be allowed based on the economic substance doctrine,
Chapter 14, and immediate gift on formation.244 The IRS lost on each of
these claims. 245 The IRS also tried to argue that section 2036(a) dictated
that the FLP's underlying assets were includable in Strangi's gross estate.246
The Tax Court would not rule on whether section 2036(a) applied to
the FLP because the IRS "asserted [its claim] only in a proposed amend-
ment to answer tendered shortly before trial." 247 The Tax Court denied the
IRS's motion to amend "because it was untimely." 248 Nevertheless, the Tax
Court stated that "[t]he actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined
with the 99-percent limited partnership interest in [the FLP] and the 47-
percent interest in Stranco, suggest the possibility of including the property
transferred to the partnership in decedent's estate under section 2036."249
Strangi I was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (hereinafter referred to as Strangi I).250 In Strangi II, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court with regard to the economic substance
doctrine, Chapter 14, and immediate gift on formation. 25' However, the
Fifth Circuit overruled the Tax Court with regard to the timeliness of the
IRS's proposed amendment. 252 The Fifth Circuit stated that the IRS's
"motion was made nearly two months, not 'shortly,' before trial and was
unlikely to cause delay or prejudice." 253 The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case to the Tax Court to be heard on the section 2036(a) claim. 254
c. The Tax Court's Analysis in Strangi III
On remand in 2003, the Tax Court issued a Memorandum Opinion
(hereinafter referred to as Strangi 1//).255 In determining whether section
2036(a)(1) applied to the facts in Strangi III, the Tax Court, as a threshold
matter, noted that the FLP's governing documents suggested that Strangi
244. Id. at 484-90.
245. Id.




250. Gulig v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
251. Id. at 282.
252. Id. at 281.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 282.
255. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003).
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had a "right to the income" from the property he transferred from the
FLP.256 The Tax Court found that "[tihe governing documents contain no
restrictions that would preclude decedent himself, acting through Mr. Gulig,
from being designated as a recipient of income from the [FLP] and
Stranco." 25
7
The Tax Court reviewed the rule that "possession or enjoyment of
transferred property is retained for purposes of section 2036(a)(1) where
there is an express or implied understanding to that effect among the parties
at the time of the transfer, even if the retained interest is not legally en-
forceable." 258 It then discussed how the estate typically has "the burden of
disproving the existence of an agreement regarding a retained interest" and
that this burden is "particularly onerous in intrafamily situations." 259 How-
ever, in this case, the IRS had the burden as "the section 2036 issues [were]
new matters within the meaning of Rule 142(a)." 260
The Tax Court found that Strangi and his children had an implied
agreement that Strangi would retain the possession or enjoyment of the
transferred property.26' The Tax Court discussed a litany of factors that it
considered evidence of such an agreement.262
The Tax Court looked to the fact that Mr. Gulig's management of the
assets did not change after they were transferred to the FLP.263 It dismissed
as de minimis the pro rata distributions the FLP made to Stranco whenever
it made a distribution to or on behalf of Strangi.264 The Tax Court found
another "feature highly probative under section 2036(a)(1) is decedent's
continued physical possession of his residence after its transfer to [the
FLP]" without paying rent.265
It also noted "that decedent contributed approximately 98 percent of his
wealth, including his residence, to the [FLP]/Stranco arrangement." 266 The
Tax Court found that Strangi did not retain assets "to cover the significant
256. Id. at 1337. Recall that section 2036(a)(1) includes in a donor-decedent's gross estate
assets in which he retained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property." I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1986) (emphasis added).
257. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1337.
258. Id. at 1336.
259. Id. at 1337.
260. Id. "The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner,... except that, in respect of any
new matter ... it shall be upon the respondent." TAX CT R. 142(a).
261. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337.
262. Id. at 1337-44.
263. Id. at 1341.
264. Id. at 1343.
265. Id. at 1338.
266. Id.
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expenses reasonably to be expected to ensue in connection with decedent's
poor health and death."267 It felt this factor was compounded by the fact
that Strangi was left with almost no liquid assets (at the time of his death,
Strangi only had $762 in the bank), and that it believed that Strangi would
be forced to sell assets to cover his living expenses. 268 In addition, the Tax
Court noted the "several instances where [the FLP] expended funds in
response to a need of decedent or his estate." 269 It also found it of interest
that none of Strangi's children objected or raised concerns when these funds
were distributed. The Tax Court found the FLP arrangement to have many
testamentary characteristics as well. It pointed to the minimal input from
Strangi's children in establishing the FLP, Strangi's contribution of the
majority of his assets, his advanced age, and his poor health.270 Based on
all of the factors, the Tax Court held that Strangi "retained possession of,
enjoyment of, or the right to income from the property transferred within
the meaning of section 2036(a)(1)." 271
d. The Concerns with the Tax Court's Analysis
The Tax Court clearly found the valuation discount in this case to be
abusive. 272 However, it made it very clear in Strangi I that the family entity
would not be disregarded under the IRS's attacks based on the economic
substance doctrine, Chapter 14, or immediate gift on formation. Since the
Tax Court could not seem to find any other reasons to disallow or reduce
the discount in question, it found itself with two options; permit the
valuation discount or force section 2036(a) to include the family entity's
underlying assets in Strangi's estate. 273 The Tax Court chose the latter.274
267. Id. at 1339.
268. Id. at 1338.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1339-40.
272. Id.
In view of our rejection of respondent's belated attempt to raise section 2036 and
respondent's request that we disregard the partnership agreement altogether, we are
constrained to accept the evidence concerning discounts applicable to decedent's
interest in the partnership and in Stranco as of the date of death. We believe that the
result of respondent's expert's discounts may still be overgenerous to petitioner, but
that result is the one that we must reach under the evidence and under the applicable
statutes.
Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 492 (2000), affid in part and rev'd in part, 293 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 2002).
273. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1332 (2003).
274. See generally id.
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As the adage goes, hard cases make bad law, and the Tax Court's opinion in
this case has many troubling aspects.
As a threshold matter, the Tax Court used section 2036(a) to disallow a
valuation discount in a manner that is completely inconsistent with that
code section's intended purpose. As discussed in Part III above, section
2036(a) was enacted to prevent donor-decedents from transferring assets to
their intended heirs while retaining the possession or enjoyment there-
from.275 Strangi did not give anything to his children.276 He contributed
99.47% of the FLP's assets in exchange for 99.47% of the FLP.277 His
children contributed 0.53% of the assets for their 0.53% of the FLP.278
Strangi changed the form of his assets by contributing them to the FLP, for
which he claimed a valuation discount.2 79 However, since Strangi made no
transfer to his intended heirs, section 2036(a) is inapplicable to the
situation. Nevertheless, the Tax Court used section 2036(a) to disregard the
family entity since it could not otherwise find a way to disallow the valu-
ation discount.280 Such usage is clearly not in accordance with section
2036(a)'s intended purpose and is completely inappropriate in this case.
As discussed further herein, the precedent established in this case de-
feats the use of most family entities as a vehicle for lifetime gifting, a
recognized and widely used purpose. As a result, the underlying assets of
almost every family entity interest that was gifted away is now includable
in the donor-decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1).
As discussed above in Part IV.A, the Supreme Court stated in Byrum
that "[t]he term 'right,' certainly when used in a tax statute.... connotes an
ascertainable and legally enforceable power."281 The Supreme Court also
stated that "[t]he use of the term 'right' implies that restraints on the
exercise of power are to be recognized and that such restraints deprive the
person exercising the power of a 'right' to do So."282 Further, the Supreme
Court found that a fiduciary duty, such as that which a manager of an FLP
owes to the FLP and its minority owners, is a legal restraint that deprives
such manager from having the "right" to distribute income and principal
from the FLP.283
275. United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969).
276. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 481.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 483.
280. See generally Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003).
281. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972).
282. Id. at 139 n.14.
283. Id. at 141-42.
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The Tax Court found that under section 2036(a)(1), Strangi had the
"right to the income" from the transferred property because he, through Mr.
Gulig, managed the FLP and had the unrestricted ability to distribute assets
to himself.284 The Tax Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's rule with
regard to the term "right" in section 2036(a)(2). 285 However, the Tax Court
did not apply the same rule when determining whether there was a "right to
the income" under section 2036(a)(1). Instead, the Tax Court ignored the
fiduciary duty that Strangi, via Mr. Gulig, owed to the FLP and its
members. 286 Therefore, under the Tax Court's rationale, every donor that
has any control over distribution decisions has retained the "right to the
income" over transferred assets for purposes of section 2036(a)(1) since his
fiduciary duty as majority shareholder, manager, or director does not create
a legal restraint on his ability to make the distributions (i.e., his right to
income). 28
7
Even if the Tax Court recognized a donor-decedent's fiduciary duty,
the manner in which it determined whether a donor-decedent retained the
enjoyment from transferred assets makes the assets transferred to virtually
every family entity established for estate planning purposes includable in
such donor-decedent's estate under section 2036(a)(1). It is established law
that "possession or enjoyment of transferred property is retained for
purposes of section 2036(a)(1) where there is an express or implied under-
284. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1337. Section 2036(a)(1) includes assets in a
donor-decedent's gross estate if he retained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property." I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1986). The implied agreement regarding a
donor-decedent's retention of enjoyment of property is used to establish retained enjoyment.
However, if a right to the income from the property is established, no further inquiry is needed as
that is sufficient on its own to trigger section 2036(a)(1).
285. "As used in section 2036(a)(2), the term 'right' has been construed to connote 'an
ascertainable and legally enforceable power'." Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1340.
286. Id. at 1342-43. It could be argued that the Tax Court did not mention Mr. Gulig's
fiduciary duty to the FLP and the Estate of Strangi children because it considered Mr. Gulig's
constraints to be illusory. Id. at 1343. However, the Tax Court did not discuss fiduciary duties in
its analysis of whether section 2036(a)(1) applied in this case. Therefore, the language of the
opinion in this case can easily be used in future cases to include assets in a donor-decedent's estate
regardless of any fiduciary duty such donor-decedent may owe. Furthermore, the Tax Court has
previously failed to apply the Supreme Court's rule with regard to the term "right" to section
2036(a)(1). See Reichardt v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 144, 151 (2000).
287. The donor-decedent need not be the sole manager to have retained a "right to the
income" under section 2036(a)(1). I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (1986). Treasury regulations state that "it
is immaterial (i) whether the power was exercisable alone or only in conjunction with another
person or persons, whether or not having an adverse interest; (ii) in what capacity the power was
exercisable by the decedent or by another person or persons in conjunction with the decedent."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1960).
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standing to that effect among the parties at the time of the transfer, even if
the retained interest is not legally enforceable."
288
In determining if such an agreement existed, the Tax Court continued
to use an oppressive standard of proof.289 The Tax Court puts an acknow-
ledged "onerous" burden on the donor-decedent's estate to prove that the
donor-decedent and his donees did not have an actual or implied agreement
regarding the retention of the possession or enjoyment of property trans-
ferred to a family entity.290 The mere lack of evidence that such an
agreement existed does not appear to meet this burden of proof. Instead,
there probably is a need for some evidence that a minority owner actually
enforced his minority rights to the detriment of the donor-decedent.
Evidence sufficient to meet this onerous burden would probably be a
minority owner's lawsuit to enforce his rights against the donor-decedent.
Since such fact patterns are rare, the burden of proof alone should be
enough to allow the IRS to successfully challenge virtually every family
entity under section 2036(a)(1).
The manner in which the Tax Court analyzed the facts in Strangi III to
determine if an implied agreement existed is also very troubling. It is even
more troubling than its analysis in Reichardt or Schauerhamer because in
both of those cases, there was significant evidence of an implied agreement
that the donor-decedent in question was to retain the substantial present
economic benefits from transferred assets. 291 While the Tax Court's analy-
sis in Reichardt and Schauerhamer was somewhat foreboding of the
inappropriate future application of section 2036(a)(1), the outcomes seemed
appropriate given their facts. Conversely, the facts in Strangi III did not
seem to warrant a finding of an implied agreement.
The Tax Court states that "the crucial characteristic is that virtually
nothing beyond formal title changed in decedent's relationship to his assets.
Mr. Gulig managed decedent's affairs both before and after the transfer."
292
Similar to its analysis in Reichardt, the Tax Court continued to ignore that
the donor-decedent's relationship to the transferred assets changes because,
after the transfer, he owes a fiduciary duty to the other owners and the
family entity with regard to the use of such assets.
288. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1336.
289. Id. at 1338.
290. Id.
291. Reichardt, 114 T.C. 144; Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997).
292. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1339.
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Mr. Gulig owed a fiduciary duty to the FLP and the Strangi children
with regard to the use of the transferred assets.293 He did not have this duty
before the transfer.294 The Tax Court's failure to consider a donor-
decedent's fiduciary duty is not only inconsistent with Byrum, but it also
encourages donors to change from successful asset management to new
untested asset management. This can be especially onerous for a family
operated business. A family entity that owns and operates a business would
have to replace its managers, which could be severely detrimental to the
business.295
The Tax Court, in Strangi III, also created a new de minimis exception
to the rule in Byrum. 296 The Tax Court reasoned that when the minority
ownership in a family entity is de minimis with regard to overall percentage
of ownership, even if such minority ownership interest is, as in this case,
controlling, the donor-decedent still had the benefit from the majority of the
property.297 Given the onerous burden of proof that the Tax Court es-
tablished, de minimis minority ownership is "insufficient to negate the
probability that the decedent retained economic enjoyment of his assets." 298
This rule regarding de minimis minority ownership seems unwise. It
denies an individual the ability to gift interests of his entity away unless the
individual makes a significant gift. Small gifts would be brought back into
the donor-decedent's estate under section 2036(a)(1)'s new de minimis rule.
For example, Strangi would not be able to successfully gift, for transfer tax
purposes, an $11,000 interest in his FLP to one of his children. He would
either have to make a larger gift (e.g., $3,000,000) or make the gift from
other assets.299 There could be many barriers to either option and the Tax
293. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137 (1972).
294. Id.
295. As mentioned previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently found the lack of change in the management of transferred assets to be "irrelevant" in
determining if the exception to section 2036(a) for a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration applied. Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598 at *9 (5th Cir.
2004). Hopefully, the Fifth Circuit will use similar reasoning when determining if sections
2036(a)(1) or (2) apply to a given transaction.
296. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1341-43.
297. Id. at 1342. "Where, as here, the only interest in the partnership other than that held by
the decedent is de minimis, a pro rata payment is hardly more than a token in nature." Id. at 1338.
298. Id. at 1338.
299. It is not clear from the Tax Court's opinion how large a minority ownership needs to be
in order to be considered more than de minimis. The Tax Court described the minority ownership
in Byrum as significant. Id. at 1341. In Byrum, the decedent owned at least 71% of each corpora-
tion and, therefore, the smallest minority ownership was 29%. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 126. The Tax
Court may consider 29% minority ownership to be significant. However, the minority ownership
in Byrum ran to a significant number of unrelated parties, and the Tax Court may require a higher
minority ownership percentage to be considered significant when dealing with family members.
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Court is merely frustrating the accepted estate planning technique of
lifetime gifting. 300 Furthermore, this rule is inequitable as it denies an in-
dividual the ability to gift merely because his assets are illiquid while
letting other individuals with liquid assets gift without restriction. 301
The Tax Court seemed particularly swayed by the fact that Strangi did
not pay rent while he lived in his residence after he transferred it to the
FLP.302 It stated, "[a] residential lessor dealing at arm's length would
hardly be content merely to accrue a rental obligation for eventual payment
more than 2 years later." 303 While this statement may be true, Strangi only
rented the residence for two months before he died.304 The accrued rent
was a relatively small amount, and the delay was likely related to the
administration of Strangi's estate. It is not unusual for a decedent's creditor
to experience significant delays in payment as a result of the administration
of the decedent's estate.
Furthermore, the FLP paid taxes on the accrued rental income. 305 The
Tax Court felt that accrual of the rental obligations were mere accounting
entries that "alone are of small moment in belying the existence of an
agreement for retained possession and enjoyment." 306 In this case, how-
ever, the accrual was more than mere bookkeeping. The FLP actually paid
taxes on the accrued rent.307 If the FLP did not intend to collect the rent, it
would not have paid taxes on the obligation. Accordingly, the fact that
Strangi did not pay rent for two months seems of little probative value and
is unworthy of the significance the Tax Court placed on it.
The Tax Court also attributed great importance to Strangi's con-
tribution of 98% of his assets to the FLP and the mere $762 he had in the
bank at his death.308 The Tax Court did not consider Strangi's $172,000 in
300. The Supreme Court has recognized lifetime giving via an entity as an accepted method
of estate planning. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 149 n.34.
301. The Fifth Circuit recently stated, "we know of no principal of partnership law that
would require the minority partner to own a minimum percentage interest in the partnership for
the entity to be legitimate and its transfers bona fide." Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529,
2004 WL 1119598 at *9 (5th Cir. 2004). It made this comment with regard to the exception to
section 2036(a) related to a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration. Id. It is hopeful
that the Fifth Circuit will use this same analysis when determining if sections 2036(a)(1) or (2)
apply to a given transaction.
302. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1338.
303. Id.
304. Strangi transferred his residence to the FLP on August 12, 1994. Id. at 1334. He died
two months later on October 14, 1994. Id. at 1335.
305. Id. at 1338.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1335.
308. Id. at 1338.
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"liquifiable" assets when determining if Strangi retained enough assets to
cover his basic needs. It found it "unreasonable to expect that decedent
would be forced to rely on sale of assets to meet his basic costs of
living." 309 It is the Tax Court's disregard of the liquifiable assets, however,
that seems unreasonable.
The opinion does not state of what type of assets the $172,000 was
comprised. Liquifiable assets, however, implied marketable securities such
as stocks and bonds.310 It is quite reasonable, and a common asset manage-
ment strategy, to invest one's assets in low risk investment vehicles such as
bonds. Bonds generally pay significantly higher interest than a savings or
checking account. Such assets are easily liquidated as cash is needed and
generally generate more income than cash sitting in a bank account.
Furthermore, it is reasonable for Strangi to anticipate a minimal return on
his $10,000,000 investment. (One relatively small payment was made on
Strangi's behalf.)311
An individual's expectation that he will receive a return on his
investment is not the same as a guarantee that such individual will receive
funds from the investment. Nevertheless, the Tax Court implies that if an
individual receives income from an investment in a family entity, there
must have been an agreement that he was entitled to such income. Had the
Tax Court considered the $172,000 as available to cover Strangi's needs, as
well as a reasonable return on his $10,000,000 investment in the FLP, such
assets plus his $3,000 monthly income would have easily covered his
expected expenses for his relatively short life expectancy. Therefore, the
fact that Strangi contributed most of his assets to the FLP should not be
used as evidence that he had an implied agreement to retain the substantial
present economic benefits from the transferred property.
Similar to what it considered a lack of funds to cover Strangi's basic
needs, the Tax Court found it compelling that Strangi did not retain enough
assets outside of the FLP to cover the reasonably expected expenses asso-
ciated with his death.312 It discussed several distributions that were made
after his death as part of the administration of his estate. 313 The largest such
309. Id.
310. It is likely that a large portion, if not all, of the liquifiable assets were bonds. Bonds are
commonly held by elderly individuals who desire low risk investments as they anticipate
eventually selling such assets to cover their retirement needs.
311. The FLP paid for the back surgery for one of Estate of Strangi's caregivers. Estate of
Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1335. The opinion does not state the cost of the
operation, but it was undoubtedly a small return compared to the $10,000,000 investment.
312. Id. at 1338-39.
313. Id. at 1335.
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distribution being $3,187,800 for estate taxes.314 It also gave weight to the
fact that the underlying purpose behind these distributions was the needs of
the estate. 315 In addition, the Tax Court noted that Strangi's children
"raised no objections or concerns when large sums were advanced for
expenditures of decedent or his estate [and found this to imply] an under-
standing that decedent's access thereto would not be restricted."
316
Distributions made from the FLP to cover the expenses of Strangi's
estate do not speak to an agreement that the FLP's assets would be so avail-
able. To the contrary, the distributions are evidence of the children acting
in their own best interests. Strangi's estate could have sold interests in the
FLP to raise the funds needed to cover the costs of administration. An in-
terest in the FLP, however, would have likely sold for much less than the
value of its proportionate share of underlying assets. Such a sale would
probably have resulted in the children ultimately receiving much less from
their father's estate. Conversely, distributions from the FLP to Strangi's
estate likely resulted in the children receiving more. It should be expected
that the children would be in favor of such distributions, instead of
objecting to them as the Tax Court suggests they should have done, as they
were acting in their own best interests. On the other hand, if interests in the
FLP could have been sold at a premium, such distributions probably would
not have been made as the children would have then benefited more from a
sale. Clearly, the distributions do not support an implied agreement. They
are merely evidence of the children acting in their own best interests.
The Tax Court also gave weight to what it considered testamentary
characteristics associated with the formation of the FLP and Stranco.
317
The FLP was undoubtedly established for estate planning purposes.
318
However, there is no logical connection between the fact that a family en-
tity is set up for estate planning purposes and an implied agreement that a
donor-decedent would retain the enjoyment of transferred property. To the
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1339.
317. Id.
318. Id. "
Mr. Gulig established the entities using Fortress documents with little, if any, input
from other family members. The contributed property included the majority of
decedent's assets in general and his investments, a prime concern of estate planning, in
particular. Decedent was advanced in age and suffering from serious health con-
ditions. Furthermore, as discussed in Estate of Strangi I at 485-86, the purpose of the
partnership arrangement was not to provide a joint investment vehicle for the
management of decedent's assets, but was consistent with testamentary intent.
Id. at 1339.
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contrary, if a donor-decedent established a family entity for estate planning
purposes, that individual utilized a relatively sophisticated estate plan. As
such, the donor-decedent likely received professional advice or had sig-
nificant personal knowledge of estate planning and would have known that
an implied agreement would frustrate his estate plan. The fact that a donor-
decedent created a family entity as part of an estate plan should be evidence
that they would go to great lengths to ensure that such an implied agreement
did not exist.
In this case, Mr. Gulig received professional advice from the Fortress
Group. He clearly understood the required formalities. 31 9 The Tax Court
acknowledged that "the participants involved in the [FLP]/Stranco
arrangement generally proceeded such that 'the proverbial 'i's were dotted'
and 't's were crossed."' 320 Given Mr. Gulig's careful and strict treatment of
the FLP, it is likely that he understood that an implied agreement between
Strangi and his children would have defeated his estate plan. Accordingly,
the testamentary characteristics discussed by the Tax Court should not be
evidence of an implied agreement but should be treated as evidence that
such an implied agreement did not exist.
With its analysis of section 2036(a)(1) in Strangi III, the Tax Court has
virtually nullified the use of family entities as estate planning tools. The
underlying assets of every family entity in which a donor-decedent had
discretionary authority over distributions, either alone or in conjunction
with others, are now includable in the donor-decedent's estate. Even if a
donor-decedent did not have such authority, a family entity's underlying
assets are still probably includable in his estate. The Tax Court's unrea-
sonable burden of proof, combined with its tendency to construe almost any
fact as major evidence of an implied agreement, means the Tax Court can
easily apply section 2036(a)(1) to virtually every family entity.
C. SECTION 2036(a)(2) REVISITED
The Tax Court determined that section 2036(a)(1) caused the
underlying assets in the FLP and Stranco to be included in Strangi's
estate. 321 Such a determination was enough to settle the matter in question.
However, in what can only be seen as a complete lack of judicial restraint,
the Tax Court then determined that section 2036(a)(2) applied to the facts in
Strangi III as "an alternative to our conclusions concerning section
319. See id. at 1338.
320. Id. (quoting Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 486 (2000)).
321. Id. at 1337.
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2036(a)(1)." 322 It is not clear whether the Tax Court was concerned that its
opinion regarding section 2036(a)(1) was going to be overruled and, there-
fore, wanted to provide another rationale for inclusion under section
2036(a), or whether it just felt like expressing its opinion on section
2036(a)(2). In either case, the Tax Court has established yet another pre-
cedent for including the underlying assets of almost every family entity
used for estate planning in its donor-decedent's gross estate.
The Supreme Court's decision in Byrum, discussed in Part IV.A above,
serves as the basis for the proposition that section 2036(a)(2) does not apply
to family entities. 323 Section 2036(a)(2) includes in a donor-decedent's es-
tate the value of assets such donor-decedent gifted away if he retained "the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from."324 In Strangi III, the Tax Court compared the legal restraints the
Supreme Court found on Byrum's "right to designate" under section
2036(a)(2) to Strangi's "right to designate." 325
The Tax Court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court in [Byrum] relied upon
several impediments to the exercise of powers held by Mr. Byrum in
concluding that such powers did not warrant inclusion under section
2036(a)(2)." 326 Byrum had the power to vote stock in a family entity held
in a trust, but an independent trustee had the sole authority to determine
when to pay or withhold trust income.327 Another constraining factor was
that corporate directors and shareholders owed a fiduciary duty to the
family entity and its minority owners to promote the best interests of the
family entity.328 In Byrum, the fiduciary duties ran to a significant number
of unrelated minority shareholders.329 Additionally, the corporations in
Byrum owned and operated going concerns. The directors' fiduciary duty
to the corporations had to take into account the needs of the businesses.
Decisions regarding payment of dividends "would be subject to the
322. Id.
323. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15,
1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-021 (Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); and
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993).
324. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (1986).
325. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1340.
326. Id. at 1342.
327. Id. at 1340.
328. Id. at 1342.
329. Id.
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economic and business realities consequent upon the status of the relevant
corporations as typical small operating enterprises." 330
Strangi III, in contrast, did not deal with income running to a trust with
an independent trustee.331 Therefore, the only constraint Strangi, through
Mr. Gulig, had on his "right to designate" (and the one relied upon in
establishing most family entities) was the fiduciary duty that a manager and
majority owner owes to the entity and its minority owners.
The FLP in Strangi III did not own a going concern. In exercising his
discretion with regard to distributions, Mr. Gulig's did not have to take into
account the economic realities of an operating business. 332 Furthermore,
the only unrelated minority owner was a charity to which the Strangi
children gave a 1% interest in Stranco (or a 0.01% interest in the FLP via
Stranco). The Tax Court felt that "[a] charity given a gratuitous 1-percent
interest would not realistically exercise any meaningful oversight."333
The only other minority owners were the Strangi children who owned
52% of Stranco (or 0.52% of the FLP). The Tax Court felt that they too did
not have a meaningful stake in the FLP. More importantly, the Tax Court
found that "[i]ntrafamily fiduciary duties within an investment vehicle
simply are not equivalent in nature to the obligations created by the
[Byrum] scenario." 334
The Tax Court was of the opinion that Byrum did "not require blind
application of its holding to scenarios where the purported fiduciary duties
have no comparable substance." 335 It stated that "the Supreme Court's
opinion in [Byrum] provides no basis for 'presuming' that fiduciary
obligations will be enforced in circumstances divorced from the safeguards
of business operations and meaningful independent interests or over-
sight." 336 Accordingly, the Tax Court found Mr. Gulig's fiduciary duties to
be "illusory." 337 It concluded "that the value of assets transferred to [the
FLP] and Stranco [was] includable in decedent's gross estate under section
2036(a)(2)." 338
Since the Tax Court disregards the fiduciary duty owed to family
members, the underlying assets of all family entities that do not have
330. Id.






337. Id. at 1342.
338. Id. at 1343.
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significant minority ownership interests held by unrelated parties would be
includable in a donor-decedent's estate under section 2036(a)(2). Even if
there are such unrelated minority owners, section 2036(a)(2) recapture
would likely be triggered if the family entity is not operating a business.
It is hard to argue that the Tax Court's rationale in Strangi III regarding
section 2036(a)(2) contradicts Byrum. The facts in Byrum are extremely far
removed from the facts in Strangi III, and it is easy to distinguish the two
cases. It is reasonable for the Tax Court to determine that the fiduciary duty
in Strangi III is neither equivalent to that found in Byrum nor rises to the
level of a restraint on a "right to designate." 339 The Supreme Court may
ultimately disagree with the Tax Court on this point, however, nothing in
Byrum seems to require such a holding. Nevertheless, the Tax Court's
ruling on this issue is imprudent.
As discussed previously, the IRS issued several Private Letter Rulings
and Technical Advice Memorandums over a stretch of more than fifteen
years approving the concept that intrafamily fiduciary duties created a
limitation on the "right to designate" so as not to trigger section 2036(a)(2)
recapture, regardless of presence of a business. 340 The Tax Court stated that
"[t]hese written determinations are expressly declared by statute to be
without precedential force. [citation omitted] Thus, any claimed reliance on
them is unavailing." 341 However, countless taxpayers have relied on these
rulings in establishing family entities for estate planning purposes, and the
Tax Court's opinion in Strangi III is likely to thwart much of this planning.
The Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation in Byrum. A
prior case, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.,342 held "that a settlor's retention
of broad powers of management [did] not necessarily subject an inter vivos
trust to the federal estate tax." 343 However, Northern Trust was issued be-
fore a statutory analogy to section 2036(a)(2) and therefore did not control.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to explain the
holding in the case as the following:
[The holding] may have been relied upon in the drafting of
hundreds of inter vivos trusts. [footnote omitted] The modi-
339. However, it is not reasonable for the Tax Court to completely disregard the fiduciary
duty when determining whether section 2036(a)(1) applies as discussed in Part IV.B.6.c above.
340. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Aug. 2, 1991); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-11-004 (Nov. 15,
1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-021(Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Apr. 15, 1994); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (Mar. 12, 1993).
341. Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1343 (2003).
342. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
343. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 133 (1972) (citing N. Trust Co. 278 U.S. at 348-
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fication of this principle now sought by the Government could
have a seriously adverse impact, especially upon settlors (and their
estates) who happen to have been "controlling" stockholders of a
closely held corporation. Courts properly have been reluctant to
depart from an interpretation of tax law which has been generally
accepted when the departure could have potentially far-reaching
consequences. When a principle of taxation requires reexami-
nation, Congress is better equipped than a court to define precisely
the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When
courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with
assurance on what appear to be established rules lest they be sub-
sequently overturned. Legislative enactments, on the other hand,
although not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the
taxpayers advance warning.34 4
The Tax Court ruled in such a manner that will adversely affect an
incredibly large number of taxpayers. They will have to change their estate
plans and have likely lost several years of annual gift exclusions, for the
assets believed to be given away in prior years are now includable in their
estate under section 2036(a)(2). Not only did the Tax Court fail to show
proper judicial restraint per the Supreme Court, but it did so as an alter-
native conclusion. The Tax Court's discussion of section 2036(a)(2) was
superfluous because it had already ruled that the assets in the FLP were
includable in Strangi's estate under section 2036(a)(1). 345
V. THE BONA FIDE SALE EXCEPTION
Section 2036(a) contains a parenthetical exception (the "Bona Fide
Sale Exception") to the general rule of inclusion in a decedent's gross estate
under sections 2036(a)(1) or (2).346 Properly applied, the Bona Fide Sale
Exception can remove a transfer to a family entity from recapture under
sections 2036(a)(1) or (2), thereby alleviating many concerns associated
with the Tax Court's prior opinions. However, if the Bona Fide Sale
344. Id. at 134-35.
345. It is interesting to note that the Tax Court issued a Memorandum Opinion in this case.
Memorandum Opinions are for cases involving settled law. By issuing a Memorandum Opinion,
the Tax Court is stating that there is nothing new about this opinion and its rulings are in
accordance well established precedent. This case, however, clearly involved interpretations of
section 2036(a) that are completely inconsistent with the generally accepted interpretation of the
law and should have been issued as a regular opinion.
346. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) - (2) (1986).
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Exception is given an overly expansive interpretation, it could open the
door to many abuses section 2036(a) was enacted to prevent.
The Bona Fide Sale Exception provides that a transfer described in
sections 2036(a)(1) or (2) does not cause inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate if it is "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.' 347 The Tax Court has determined that the Bona
Fide Sale Exception has "two requirements: (1) A bona fide sale ... and
(2) adequate and full consideration." 34
8
A. BONA FIDE SALE
The Tax Court has equated a bona fide sale with "an arm's length
transaction." 349 It has determined that an arm's length transaction can only
occur when there are multiple parties involved in the bargaining and
negotiating of the deal. 350 In other words, if an individual stands on both
sides of the transaction, there can be no bona fide sale.351 For example, if a
decedent created a family entity with his children, but did not include them
in the formation process, the Tax Court would most likely find that the
decedent stood on both sides of the transaction and that it was not arm's
length. 352 Conversely, if each of his children "was represented by his or her
own independent counsel and had input into the decision-making as to how
[the family entity] was to be structured and operated," the Tax Court would
probably find an arm's length agreement. 353
347. Id.





353. Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 579 (2003). But see Estate of
Abraham v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 975 (2004), T.C.M. (R.I.A.) 2004-39, 2004 WL 303937,
at *3, *11-'12 (holding that the exception did not apply when "decedent's children, their
respective counsel, as well as decedent's legal guardians and representatives agreed" to an estate
plan that included utilization of family limited partnerships.)
The Tax Court has also considered whether a decedent retained enough assets outside of the
family entity to maintain his or her standard of living in determining whether a transaction was
arm's length. Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 579 (2003). While the Tax
Court does not expressly articulate its reasoning, its theory seems to be that no reasonable
decedent would transfer all of his assets into a family entity as part of an arm's length agreement
since he would not be able to maintain his standard of living thereafter. See id. However, this
reasoning is flawed. For example, if a decedent could retain an interest in transferred property
under the bona fide sale exception, it would not be unreasonable for such a decedent to agree, as
part of an arm's length transaction, to contribute all of such decedent's assets to a family entity if
the agreement also provided that the decedent would receive enough assets from the family entity
to maintain his or her standard of living.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit takes a
different view. It is of the opinion that "the absence of negotiations
between family members over price or terms is not a compelling factor in
the determination as to whether a sale is bona fide."354 Instead, the Fifth
Circuit applies an objective standard to this determination. 355 Under this
objective standard, a "transaction that is a bona fide sale between strangers
must also be bona fide between members of the same family." 356 It does
not add any additional requirements for family transactions. 357 In the Fifth
Circuit, a transaction between family members would fail the bona fide sale
requirement only if it was a disguised gift or a sham transaction." 358
Therefore, if a transfer was for adequate and full consideration, "the only
possible grounds for challenging the legitimacy of the transaction are
whether the transferor actually parted with the [assets in question] and the
transferee actually parted with the requisite adequate and full
consideration." 359
The Tax Court is trying to deal with its perceived abuses of family
entities by putting additional requirements on a transaction between family
members that would otherwise be a bona fide sale if it were between
unrelated parties. 360 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit is potentially
opening family entities up to a variety of uses that section 2036(a) was
designed to prevent. For example, a transferor/decedent might be able to
transfer his residence, yacht, and other possessions to a family entity; and
transfer most, if not all, of the entity to his children, and retain use of or
direct who may use such possessions rent-free.
This is not necessarily the case. The Fifth Circuit has not flushed out
what it means for the transferor/decedent to have actually parted with the
transferred asset in the case of a family entity. 361 It should require that
transferor/decedent be subject to and abide by a fiduciary duty to the family
354. Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598 at *5 (5th Cir. 2004).
355. Id.; Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 764 (5th Cir. 1997).
356. Kimbell, 2004 WL 1119598, at *5.
357. Id. The Fifth Circuit holds transactions between family members to "heightened scru-
tiny to insure that the sale is not a sham transaction or a disguised gift. [However, this] scrutiny is
limited to the examination of objective facts that would confirm or deny that taxpayer's assertion
that the transaction is bona fide or genuine." Id. at *7.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 579-581 (2003). Abraham, 87 T.C.M.
(CCH) 975 (2004), 2004 WL 303937, at *3, *1 1-*12; Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641,
1653 (2002).
361. It is interesting to note, however, that the Fifth Circuit implied that Strangi involved a
sham transaction. Kimbell, 2004 WL 1119598, at *6.
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entity and its other members. This would prevent such potential abuses and
is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's rationale of not creating additional
requirements for transactions between family members, as it seems unlikely
that an individual would enter into a similar arrangement with an unrelated
individual if such unrelated individual did not owe him or the entity any
fiduciary duty.
B. ADEQUATE AND FULL CONSIDERATION
"Adequate and full consideration," the other requirement to the Bona
Fide Sale Exception, became part of the Internal Revenue Code in the
Revenue Act of 1926.362 Prior thereto, the Internal Revenue Code only
required "fair consideration." 363 Congress changed the language "after
courts had given 'fair consideration' an expansive construction." 364
"Adequate and full consideration" for purposes of the estate and gift tax
requires something more than consideration sufficient to form a contract
under the common law.365 The Tax Court has taken the view that
consideration must be for money or some other benefit "of the equivalent
money value in order to constitute the required 'adequate and full
consideration.' 366 The Tax Court has further taken the position with
regard to assets contributed to a family entity that "[wlithout any change
whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or prospect for profit, as for
example, where others make contributions of property or services in the
interest of true joint ownership or enterprise, there exists nothing but a
circuitous 'recycling' of value." 367 In other words, if the underlying assets
representing an individual's interest in a family entity are substantially the
same in form and managed in substantially the same manner as they were
prior to the transfer to the family entity, then there has been no change to
such individual's relationship to the assets. The Tax Court held that "such
instances of pure recycling do not rise to the level of a payment of
consideration" for purposes of section 2036(a).368
362. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9, 70 (1926).
363. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097 (1919);
Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 227, 278 (1921); Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 253, 304 (1924).
364. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945).
365. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945).
366. Goetchius v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 495, 503 (1951).
367. Harper v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641, 1653 (2002).
368. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1653; see Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 580
(2003) (finding that transfers to family partnerships that "had economic substance and operated as
joint enterprises for profit through which the children actively participated in the management and
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The problem with this concept is that a transfer of assets in exchange
for an interest in an entity that represents those same assets falls within the
definition of adequate and full consideration.369 If an individual transfers
assets to a family entity in exchange for an interest in the family entity of
similar value, that individual has received a benefit "of the equivalent
money value." 370 The similar value, however, does not need to equal what
a willing-buyer would pay for the interest. The Fifth Circuit expressed this
as follows:
The business decision to exchange cash or other assets for a
transfer-restricted, non-managerial interest in a limited partnership
involves financial considerations other than the purchaser's ability
to turn right around and sell the newly acquired limited partnership
interest for 100 cents on the dollar. Investors who acquire such
interests do so with the expectation of realizing benefits such as
management expertise, security and preservation of assets, capital
appreciation and avoidance of personal liability. Thus there is
nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that the
investor's dollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at
arm's length for adequate and full consideration and, on the other
hand, that the asset thus acquired has a present fair market value,
i.e., immediate sale potential, of substantially less than the dollars
just paid-a classic informed trade-off.371
The Tax Court stated that to hold that recycling of value constituted
adequate and full consideration "would open section 2036 to a myriad of
abuses engendered by unilateral paper transformations."372 The Tax
Court's warning is valid, especially if the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the Bona Fide Sale Exception is overly expanded. If the Tax Court adopts
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Bona Fide Sale Exception and
incorporates the fiduciary duty requirement in the case of a family entity (as
suggested above), the analysis of whether the exception applies should be
similar to that of whether sections 2036(a)(1) or (2) recapture apply. When
properly done, only transactions in which the transferor/decedent abided by
his fiduciary duty to a family entity and its members would not come under
the purview of sections 2036(a)(1) or (2). As such, the concerns over
development of the respective assets of such partnerships during their parents' lives" did not
constitute recycling of value).
369. See Goetchius, 17 T.C. at 503.
370. See id.
371. Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598, at *8 (5th Cir. 2004).
372. Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1653.
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potential abuses as well as the concerns associated with the Tax Court's
prior opinions would be avoided.
VI. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Section 2036(a)(1) properly addresses the situation where a donor-
decedent abused a family entity and retained the substantial present
economic benefits from transferred assets. The problem is that even when a
donor-decedent does not retain such benefits, the Tax Court will apply
section 2036(a)(1) if it believes the valuation discounts associated with the
family entity are abusive.373 In doing so, the Tax Court is not following the
precedent the Supreme Court established in Byrum and is frustrating a
generally accepted method of estate planning-inter vivos gifting via an
entity.374 Gifts of property should not be disregarded because the transferor
did so via a family entity. To the contrary, family entities should be en-
couraged for their non-tax benefits discussed in Part I above.
375
Moreover, the Tax Court's dismissal of numerous prior IRS rulings
that family entities did not trigger section 2036(a)(2) recapture based on the
Supreme Court's fiduciary duty analysis in Byrum retroactively punishes
countless taxpayers who relied on Byrum and the IRS's rulings. Regardless
of the potential abuses related to valuation discounts, the Tax Court should
not interpret Supreme Court precedent and disregard IRS rulings so as to
retroactively and detrimentally affect almost all taxpayers utilizing family
entities for estate planning purposes. The Tax Court, in addressing prob-
lems with valuation discounts, has failed to consider the collateral damage
it is causing to the owners of family entities not claiming unreasonable
valuation discounts.
373. The Tax Court could alleviate their concerns about abusive valuation discounts by
changing the rule it established in Strangi I with regard to the economic substance doctrine. In
Strangi 1, the Tax Court ruled that a family entity will not be disregarded under the economic
substance doctrine if the entity was validly formed under state law. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r,
115 T.C. 478, 486-87 (2000), affd in part and rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). In
Strangi 1, the Tax Court also rejected IRS attacks on valuation discounts under Chapter 14 and
immediate gift upon formation. Id. at 487-90; see also Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 519-20
(2000). Instead, the Tax Court could establish a rule that a family entity does not have economic
substance and is therefore disregarded, unless it finds that the entity was formed for a valid non-
tax related purpose such as a business purpose. This would prevent taxpayers from obtaining val-
uation discounts on family entities that are created mainly for estate planning purposes. The
problem with changing its rule is that the Tax Court's application of the economic substance
doctrine appears to be sound and has been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Estate of Strangi, 293 F.3d at 282.
374. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 149 n.34.
375. For example, creditor protection, asset pooling, spendthrift protection, and probate
savings.
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As the Supreme Court wisely noted, Congress is best equipped to
modify generally accepted interpretations of tax law that may have been
relied upon by the drafters of "hundreds" of estate documents. 376 This is
especially the case when such modifications could have "a seriously ad-
verse impact" and "potentially far-reaching consequences." 377 Congress
gives taxpayers advance notice of such modifications.378
Congress, of course, must first decide whether situations such a Strangi
III are abusive. It is not necessarily abusive for taxpayers to willingly
"burden their property with binding legal restrictions that, in fact, reduce
the value of such property.... [To] disregard such restrictions... would be
to disregard economic reality." 379 A taxpayer should be free to damage his
property if he so desires. For example, if a taxpayer took a sledgehammer
to his car, it should not be valued in his gross estate as if it was in mint
condition. Similarly, one must wonder why a taxpayer should not be al-
lowed to "damage" the value of his assets by placing legal restrictions on
them.
An obvious counter to the "damage" argument in the family entity
context (and the point made by the Tax Court in Strangi III) is that the
valuation discounts claimed are, in reality, insignificant since the legal
restrictions on assets run to other family members. That counter, however,
should concern how much of a valuation discount should be permitted, not
whether the legal restrictions exist. If the Tax Court applied its rationale
with regard to family members in determining the amount of valuation
discounts, it could address abusive discounts without destroying almost all
family entities utilized for estate planning.
Assuming Congress considers valuation discounts abusive when taken
in connection with a family entity owned almost entirely by a donor-
decedent (as in Strangi III), it could address the situation by denying all
valuation discounts when an entity is owned almost entirely by a donor-
decedent. In effect, Congress could create a de minimis exception to valua-
tion discounts. Such an exception should be a bright-line rule that values a
decedent's interest in an applicable entity based on the value of such
entity's underlying assets. The rule should only apply to family entities es-
tablished shortly before a decedent's death (e.g., 3 years). If a decedent
lived with a family entity for years without violating section 2036(a)(1), it
376. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 134.
377. Id. at 135.
378. Id.
379. Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 522 (2000) (Foley, J., concurring).
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should be respected. The difficulty with such a rule is that it will either be
too broad or not broad enough depending on where the line is drawn (e.g.,
70% or 99%). However, if a fairly conservative line were used, the rule
would, at least, stem the more egregious scenarios.
Congress could also impose a requirement that at least 50% of a family
entity's assets consist of a family business before permitting valuation
discounts. In addition, Congress may want to consider requiring that a fam-
ily entity have an unrelated party own a substantial minority interest (e.g.,
10%) before a valuation discount is allowed. This latter rule would proba-
bly be a boon to charities as individuals would likely donate significant
interests in family entities to gain the requisite unrelated party.
Congress' best option might be to utilize all three suggestions. For
example, it could establish a statutory scheme that would only permit a
valuation discount if:
i) Minority owners, regardless of their relationship to the donor-
decedent, held at least 30% of the family entity;
ii) Unrelated minority owners held at least 10% of the family
entity; or
iii) A family run business represented at least 50% of the fair
market value of the family entity's assets.
Chapter 14 of Subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code has special
valuation rules for estate and gift tax purposes. 380 Assuming Congress de-
termines that valuation discounts as found in Strangi III are abusive,
Chapter 14 would be an appropriate place for such a rule.
381
VII. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court is aggressively applying section 2036(a) to family
entities that are commonly used for estate planning. It has signaled to the
IRS to challenge all entities under section 2036(a)(2) if family members
own most of the entity or if the entity does not run a business. In such
situations, the Tax Court will not consider the fiduciary duty owed to family
380. I.R.C. §§ 2701-04 (1994).
381. In 1987, Congress tried to deal with valuation abuses with the enactment of section
2036(c). Section 2036(c) was complex, broad, and vague. See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115
T.C. 478, 487 (2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). Section
2036(c), as enacted in 1987, is too long to reproduce here. In 1990, section 2036(c) was replaced
with what were supposed to be simpler rules. Chapter 14-Special Valuation Rules sets out new
valuation rules for transfer tax purposes. See I.R.C. §§ 2701-04.
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members significant enough to amount to a legal restriction on the donor-
decedent's "right to designate" and will apply section 2036(a)(2).
If a family entity has significant minority owners and operates a
business, the Tax Court will still probably include the entities underlying
assets in the donor-decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1). In
applying section 2036(a)(1), the Tax Court places a virtually unattainable
burden of proof on a donor-decedent's estate to prove a negative (i.e., the
non-existence of an implied agreement between the donor-decedent and a
family entity's other owners that the donor-decedent could retain the
enjoyment of the assets he transferred to the family entity). Such a burden
is even more unreasonable, if that is possible, when the Tax Court finds
evidence of an implied agreement from such facts as the donor-decedent
established the family entity for estate planning purposes, the donor-
decedent anticipated receiving or actually received distributions from his
investment in the family entity, or management of assets contributed to the
family entity was similar to pre-contribution management.
If a donor-decedent abided by a family entity's ownership agreement,
the Tax Court should respect the entity's form and not misapply section
2036(a). 382 The Tax Court should not use that subsection to address po-
tentially abusive valuation discounts, a purpose for which it was not in-
tended. Instead, Congress, if it determines that such valuation discounts are
abusive, should remedy the situation through legislative enactments.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court will probably continue to interpret section
2036(a) as it has in the past unless and until it is overruled. Strangi III is
currently under appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.383 Hopefully, the Fifth Circuit will reverse the Tax Court's de-
cision. There is renewed hope that this will occur given the Fifth Circuit's
recent opinion in Kimbell, discussed in Part V hereof, related to the Bona
Fide Sale Exception. 384 If it does not, estate planning practitioners should
reevaluate using family entities to facilitate gifting. A client should be
advised to gift other assets rather than an interest in a family entity. At a
minimum, professional estate planners should counsel clients about the
significant risks associated with a family entity's underlying assets being
brought back into their client's gross estate even when the family entity's
form is followed perfectly. Even if the Fifth Circuit reverses the Tax
382. This assumes that the family entity's form is appropriate under Byrum-that it requires
pro rata distributions, etc.
383. Rachel E. Silverman, "Popular Tool for Estate Plans Under Scrutiny," WALL ST. J.
Dec. 2, 2003, at D 1, col. 5.
384. Kimbell v. United States, No. 03-10529, 2004 WL 1119598 (5th Cir. 2004).
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Court's opinion in Strangi III, estate planning practitioners should inform
clients of such risks if they are in other circuits until such circuit or the Tax
Court issues an opinion consistent with such a reversal.
